


A large, stylized red flower graphic serves as the background for the entire page. The flower has a thick stem and a large, rounded head. The petals are a lighter shade of red, and the center is a darker red. The overall design is minimalist and modern.

# **MIGRATIONS AND CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE**

**CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS  
EHUGUNE  
EZKERRABERRI FUNDAZIOA  
BRUSSELS /2016**





## **MIGRATIONS AND CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN EUROPE**

**Xabier Aierdi, Oriol Amorós i March, Leire Diaz de Gereñu,  
Catrin Wyn Edwards, Petra Elser, Núria Franco-Guillén,  
Muntsa Garro i Costa, Peter A. Kraus & Cor van der Meer**


**Coordinator: Inaki Irazabalbeitia Fernandez**

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# 1- Foreword

The conference entitled *Migrations and Cultural and Linguistic Minorities in Europe* was held in the Bizkaia Hall in Bilbao on 26 May 2016. It was organised by the Ezkerraberri foundation, EHUgune and Centre Maurits Coppieters European foundation. This monograph gathers the contributions of the experts participating in the conference.

The conference organisers are in no doubt that the migration phenomenon is currently one of the biggest challenges facing Europe. There are many sides to this phenomenon. It can be studied from many perspectives. One of these sides or perspectives is that of Europe's linguistic and cultural diversity.

Pro-Europeanness is one of the bases of the Ezkerraberri foundation. We defend a shared, democratic and social European project. One of the essential foundations of our project is the protection, defence and promotion of Europe's linguistic and cultural diversity. On the other hand, we believe that people are entitled to receive protection and to migrate. Taking these two aspects into consideration, we felt it was appropriate to embark on a reflection designed to examine the relationships between the two of them.

Indeed, three languages –four if we take Gascon into consideration– have long coexisted in the Basque Country and there is no doubt that migrants and refugees will come to us. Likewise, if we look at the demographic pyramid of our country, we will need them if we want to enjoy a future as a society and country.

With this idea in mind, we got into contact with EHUgune and the CMC and we suggested to them that we should organise the conference together.

They took up our challenge and we got down to working together. The result of that collaboration is obvious when one considers the participation in the conference and the quality of the contribution made by the speakers: entirely positive.

### **The context of the conference**

The large numbers of migrants reaching Europe not only poses great challenges in terms of reception, settlements and social integration, unexpected consequences may arise within a specific community.

Europe has great linguistic and cultural diversity. There are over 80 autochthonous languages inside the European Union's borders. Many of them are minority languages and lack any official status.

It is evident that if a large number of migrants arrive in a territory where two languages coexist and where one is the dominant one socially, this can pose a risk for the minority language. The newcomers may opt for the dominant language as a means of social integration, leaving the minority one on one side. That situation can exacerbate the minority situation of the language even further.

Failure to properly manage migration flows and their impact on minority languages could result in minority languages suffering a clear, negative impact. Another potential consequence is the spreading of xenophobia and negative attitudes in society. It is clear that suitable, sensible policies have to be implemented if these risks are to be avoided.

The aims of the conference were:

- To explore the effect migration flows are having on Europe's cultural and linguistic minorities.
- To reflect on the conclusions.
- To highlight success stories and good practices.
- To put forward policies to properly manage the situation,
- To highlight success stories and good practices.

The conference had three main sections. Firstly, Peter Kraus and Nuria Franco-Guillen gave talks on the general positioning of the phenomenon.

The strategies being developed by various European linguistic minorities to bring immigrants closer to the autochthonous languages were examined in a roundtable discussion in which there were experts from the Basque Country, Catalonia, Friesland and Wales. Finally, various specific cases in the Basque Country were explained in another roundtable discussion. The video of the conference can be viewed via the Ezkerraberri foundation's website at <http://ezkerraberri.eus/>.

The conference could not have been a success without the commitment and work of a whole host of people. We wish to thank Prof Joxerramon Bengoetxea of EHUGune because he saw a clear means for collaboration when the issue was raised, because he promoted the proposal within his own organisation, and because he conscientiously committed himself to the preparation work. Without having to go outside the UPV/EHU-University of the Basque Country, we are grateful for the professionalism of the staff at the Bizkaia Hall and for their willingness to help. And, last but not least, we are grateful for the decision made by the scientific committee of the CMC to support the proposal through funding and resources; and also for the organisational help provided by Ignasi Centelles and Iva Petcovic. We wish also to thank our colleagues at Aralar and Ezkerraberri: Bego Rodriguez, Xabier Vallina, Aitor Arza, and Ibon Rodriguez. Last but not least, we are very grateful to professor Jone Miren Hernandez for moderating the panel on 'Minority Languages and Migrants in Europe'.

Inaki Irazabalbeitia Fernandez  
Director of the Ezkerraberri foundation





## 2. ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

### **Xabier Aierdi Urraza**

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Xabier Aierdi Urraza has a degree in Sociology and Political Science by the University of Deusto and in Information Sciences (Journalism) by the School of Communication Sciences of the University of the Basque Country. He holds a PhD in Sociology by the University of the Basque Country. He is associate professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Communication since 1994.

He has been Director of the Department of Sociology at the University of the Basque Country on three different periods. He was President of the Basque Association of Sociology and member of the Board of the FES (Spanish Federation of Sociology), of which he was vice president.

He founded the Basque Observatory of Immigration, IKUSPEGI, and was its director until January 2011.

He specializes in migration and ethnicity issues in which he did much of his research work.

In February 2011 he founded, along with Jose Antonio Oleaga, the Immigration Research Laboratory, BEGIRUNE, where he developed part of his research. He was appointed as director.

Since October 2013 he is Adviser of the Department of Employment and Social Policy of the Basque Government.

### **Oriol Amorós i March**

*Secretary of Equality, Migration and Citizenship of the Government of Catalonia,  
esther.ferre@gencat.cat*

Oriol Amorós has a degree in agricultural engineering by the School of Agriculture of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia. He has postgraduate degree in Agricultural Economics and European Union and in Management of Public Administrations by ESADE.

He was teacher of technology and economics in secondary schools from 1997 to 2000.

He has been member of the Parliament of Catalonia from 2003 to 2006 and from 2010 to 2016, where he has served as a member, spokesman and secretary on several committees such as Immigration, Business and Employment, Interior and the Research Committee on Fraud and Political Corruption. He has also been deputy spokesman of the parliamentary group of ERC.

From 2006 to 2010 he was Secretary for Immigration of the Government of Catalonia, during which he pushed forwards the National Pact for Immigration, the Law on Immigration in Catalonia and the creation of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration.

On January 26, 2016 he was appointed secretary of Equality, Migration and Citizenship of the Government of Catalonia.

He is a member of the Board of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya political party.

### **Leire Diaz de Gereñu Lasaga**

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Leire Diaz de Gereñu was born in Arrasate (Gipuzkoa, The Basque Country), but she currently lives in Vitoria (Alava, The Basque Country). She is lecturer in the department of Linguistics and Basque Studies of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of the Basque Country.

She has just got her Ph.D. with a thesis entitled “Jendaurreko konta-saioa: gertakari sozio-diskurtsiboa eta testu-genero berezitua”.

Since 2000, she does her research work in the field of linguistics, discourse analysis and the didactics of Basque language in the group of professor Itziar Idiazabal Gorrotxategi. She is especially interested in the oral language functions, oral story-telling, linguistic ability of immigrants, bilingualism and the didactics of minority languages.

She has also trained teachers. She has recently been appointed to the UNESCO Chair on World Language Heritage.

### **Catrin Wyn Edwards**

*Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, cwe6@aber.ac.uk*

Catrin Wyn Edwards holds a MSc Econ in European Governance and Public Policy from the school of European Studies, Cardiff University.

She was awarded her PhD in International Politics from the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University in 2014 for a thesis on language politics, immigration and educational policy in Catalonia, Wales and Quebec.

Prior to undertaking the PhD, Catrin worked as European Policy Officer at the Welsh Language Board.

Currently she is a Lecturer in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University. She has previously worked as a post-doctoral researcher at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa and she has been Visiting Scholar at UQAM, Montreal and the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.

Her current research explores the nature of the relationship between state and sub-state governance in the field of immigration and language policy.

### **Petra Elser**

*Director, Banaiz Bagara NGO,  
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Petra Elser was born in Germany but lives since 25 years in different European countries and languages, thus 13 years in the Basque Country.

Nowadays she is the director of the Banaiz Bagara elkarte, founded in 2009 to work in the field of Basque language and migration. Since its existence, Banaiz Bagara made important contributions to methodological innovation and social discussion on language and diversity.

Besides that, she is also a literature translator from Basque into German.

### **Núria Franco-Guillén**

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Núria Franco-Guillén is a researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. She defended her PhD in November 2015 on the analysis of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties' discourses on immigration comparing cases in Catalonia Quebec and Scotland.

She is member of the Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration where she has been involved in several national and international research projects.

She has been visiting researcher at the University of Edinburgh and the Université du Québec à Montréal.

She teaches several courses (lectures and seminars) in the Faculties of Political Science and Law at the degree and masters level.

She has been an external collaborator at several institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European University Institute or the Vrije Universiteit (Brussels).

Her research interests focus on the multi-level politics of immigration and stateless nationalism.

### **Muntsa Garro i Costa**

She works as technical staff at the secretary of Equality, Migration and Citizenship of the Government of Catalonia

### **Inaki Irazabalbeitia Fernandez**

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Inaki Irazabalbeitia got a Ph.D. in Chemistry at the University of the Basque Country.

His professional career is mostly linked to the revitalisation of Basque language and the Elhuyar Foundation group: editor of Elhuyar science magazine (1983-1990), CEO of the Elhuyar Foundation (1995-2003), CEO of Eleka Language Engineering (2006-2011) and member of the Board of Trustees (2005-2011).

Inaki was General Director of the Basque Summer University NGO (1987-1991) and member of the Board of Directors (1983-2008). He was also involved in the birth of several language normalization initiatives as Euskaldunon Egunkaria, Kontseilua or Langune.

Inaki published several literature works and numerous articles on both science communication and Basque language revitalization.

Inaki is member of the Royal Academy of the Basque Language and participates actively in the committees of Exo-onomastics and Science and Technology dictionary.

He was member of the European Parliament in the Greens-EFA group (2103-2104).

Currently, Inaki is town councillor in Tolosa and director of Ezkerraberrri Foundation. He is Honorary Member of the European Free Alliance.

### **Peter A. Kraus**

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Peter A. Kraus is professor of comparative politics and the director of the Institute for Canadian Studies at the University of Augsburg.

He has been the chair of ethnic relations at the University of Helsinki and an associate professor of political science at Humboldt University in Berlin.

He has published widely and in several languages on cultural diversity and identity politics, ethnicity and nationalism, language policy, the dilemmas of European integration, and problems of democratization and democratic theory. He is the author of *A Union of Diversity: Language, Identity, and Polity-Building in Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

His most recent publications include *The Diversities of Europe* (edited with G. Sciortino), *Ethnicities* (Special Issue), 14 (4), 2014, and *The Challenge of Minority Integration: Politics and Policies in the Nordic Nations* (edited with P. Kivisto, De Gruyter Open, 2015).

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Cor van der Meer has a degree in sociology and research methodology from the University of Groningen.

He works as project manager for the Fryske Akademy in Leeuwarden (Friesland, The Netherlands) and is member of the management team. He is head of the Mercator Research Centre on Multilingualism and Language Learning, which is a platform for Regional and Minority Languages in Europe, serving linguistic diversity.

He is an expert in the fields of multilingualism, regional and minority languages and language learning. Through the years he served as board member of a number of international organisations and is frequently presenting his work at conferences and seminars, in Europe and beyond.



# 3.THE MULTILINGUAL CITY

## THE CASES OF HELSINKI AND BARCELONA\*

**Peter A. Kraus**

**Abstract:** *Helsinki and Barcelona are particularly interesting cases for the study of the challenges associated with present-day multilingualism, due to their combining a well-entrenched endogenous patrimony of linguistic diversity, together with the politics this patrimony has entailed, with new layers of exogenous linguistic differentiation introduced by recent waves of immigration. As a result, the linguistic cleavages of the past intermingle in intricate ways with the imprint of the new heterogeneity. The assessment of the politics of multilingualism in the two cities demonstrates, on the one hand, how the national is “transnationalized” due to the new cultural and communicative practices introduced by immigrant groups. On the other hand, the politics of multilingualism is a politics that nationalizes the transnational: although the “hybridization” that is often associated with the dynamics of immigration may well change the parameters of identity politics,*



*it apparently does not entail the waning of all cultural identities in a cosmopolitan pastiche of sorts. The analysis presented leads to the normative conclusion that the recognition of linguistic identities plays a key role in linking the dynamics of complex diversity and citizenization. By just political standards, cities concerned with how to confront a diverse citizenry should open up to introduce varying combinations of a multilingual repertoire at the level of their institutions.*

## **1. Introduction: multilingualism and the city**

When social scientists analyze cultural heterogeneity in the context of cities, they generally do not devote a great amount of space to dealing with the effects language diversity and multilingualism have specifically in urban areas. Richard Sennett (1991: 133–141), to mention one prominent example, presents a poignant critique of Hannah Arendt’s conceptualization of the urban public sphere, arguing that Arendt’s view of the role of the public is so emphatically abstract and impersonal that it fails to keep in touch with the proper realm of the social. In the end, Sennett observes, it is hard to see how different people – strangers – would be able to communicate at all in the philosopher’s ideal city. Taking this into account, it must be considered paradoxical that neither does Sennett make a proper attempt at grasping the challenges that are involved in managing linguistic diversity so that a characteristically urban “culture of difference” can be institutionalized. Peter Marcuse (2002: 12), to give a second example, outlines a historical approach to the “partitioned city” which does include language in its account of cultural cleavages that may be relevant for studying urban politics. Yet, in this case too, language is only mentioned in passing, and there is no discussion of the possible connections between the linguistic and the functional or status-related divisions that are typical of partitioned cities.

In view of the tendency to abstract from the linguistic dimensions of an urban setting largely characterized by diversity, the great American sociolinguist Joshua A. Fishman (1997: 347) has perspicuously compared language in New York City to an “overlooked elephant at the zoo”. In accordance with the perspective adopted by Fishman, the thesis advanced in this contribution is that linguistic diversity is becoming an increasingly salient issue on the agenda of urban politics and policies in Western societies, at least in the European context. Thus, both political and urban sociologists, as well as scholars working in the field of ethnic relations and migration studies, are well advised to study the phenomenon more extensively. At the same time, it

seems obvious that a thorough normative assessment of the implications of identity politics, including the politics of linguistic identity, requires detailed analyses of the “micro” dimensions of political integration in contexts marked by deep cultural diversity. In most cases, these dimensions find their clearest expression at the level of cities. The approach to the analysis of language politics sketched out on the following pages is hence based on two main assumptions. First, the use of language in urban settings can be taken as a telling indicator of sweeping processes of social and political change.

Second, in European cities, at present, linguistic differentiation is a topic that deserves specific research efforts on its own right, as it raises important empirical and normative questions.<sup>1</sup>

## **2. The multilingual city, European nation-states, and the new heterogeneity**

European modernity was substantially defined by the emergence and consolidation of the political model of the nation-state, a model characterized, according to Charles Tilly (1994: 25), by “centralized organization, direct rule, uniform field administration, circumscription of resources within the territory, and expanded control over cultural practices.” Parallel to the unfolding of national forms of rule, the processes of population structuring that shaped Europe during the last five centuries involved a continuous push towards cultural homogenization. If we leave aside the presence of new immigrant minorities for a moment, many European states today apparently offer a rather homogeneous image in terms of their cultural profile. To a large extent, this homogeneity is a manufactured homogeneity, which is the result of institutional strategies designed and implemented by political authorities (Mann 2005). Almost everywhere in Europe, enforced assimilation and population transfers, not to mention more aggressive measures, played an important role in the process of state-making. Generally speaking, since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the long-term historical trend was to create uniformity within the different units composing the European state system, even if one of the main reasons for the establishment of the system was the necessity to come to grips with the new differentiation of Christianity after a protracted period of religious wars. This differentiation was therefore taken as a key criterion for delineating borders between states. Thus, the generalization of national forms of rule can be considered to be one of the most

salient features of Europe's path to modernity, and this generalization often became synonymous with cultural homogenization.

Cities played a crucial role in this process. In Stein Rokkan's well-known model of the territorial structuring of Europe, the initial sequences of nation-state making, which led to the political control and cultural standardization of a given territory by the ruler, widely overlap with the dynamics of center formation (Rokkan 1999). In the paradigmatic cases, the rise of the European nation-state presupposed the existence of an urban center acting as the driving force of dynastic expansion and concentrating economic and coercive resources. At the same time, the standards to be adopted in the territories controlled by the center reflected the cultural patterns that had become hegemonic at the center itself, including a linguistic standard. As the symbolism of their historical architecture still reveals today, European capitals such as Paris, London, or Stockholm for a long period literally embodied the cultural identities of the nations they claimed to represent, and constituted the unchallenged focal points of linguistically integrated spaces of public communication. In virtually all larger territorial states in Western Europe, the history of the metropolis was inextricably linked to the history of one national community, whose members shared a particular set of cultural attributes and spoke the same language.

The tempestuous expansion of national forms of rule towards the East, where the political scene until World War I was characterized by the continuity of imperial powers such as Habsburg or tsarist Russia, made the homogenizing impact of the modern structuring of Europe's populations and territories more dramatically visible than in the *longue durée* of nation-state formation in the West. The cultural and linguistic map of Central and Eastern Europe was traditionally more mixed and patchwork-like than in the Western half of the continent. Thus, the main urban centers of the multinational empires also remained permeated by a strong pluralism of languages and ethnicities well into modern times. In his portrait of late 18th century Vienna, the Bavarian traveller Johann Pezzl expresses his amazement by the "mixture of so many nations" and the resulting "linguistic confusion (*Sprachenverwirrung*)" that in his view were distinctive features of the imperial capital, when compared to other places in Europe. Pezzl's account includes the following "national" and "linguistic" groups: "Hungarians, Moravians, Transylvanians, Styrians, Tyrolians, Dutch, Italians, Frenchmen, Bavarians, Swabians, Silesians, Rhinelanders, Swiss, Westphalians, Lothringians etc. etc." (quoted after Therborn 1995: 53).

Table 1. Early modern share of current titular nation of the population of East European capitals

City	Year	% Total population
Bratislava	1910	38
Bucharest	1850	c. 40
Budapest	1870	46
Chisinau	1926	40
Helsinki	1890	46 (?)
Istanbul	1878	62
Kiev	1926	42
Ljubljana	1880	75
Minsk	1926	42
Prague	1846	< 36
Riga	1913	42
St. Petersburg	1910	89
Sofia	1866	c. 33
Tallinn	1871	52
Vienna	1910	85
Vilnius	1926	0 (?)
Warsaw	1897	62
Zagreb	1910	75

Source: Therborn (1995: 44).

The homogenizing force involved in the breakdown of old multinational empires and in the making of new nation-states can be grasped through the figures collected by Göran Therborn (see Table 1). Therborn refers to ethnic identities, yet in most cases these identities also include a particular linguistic dimension. Some of the evidence listed in the table may be questionable. For instance, in the case of Helsinki, a city still under tsarist rule in 1890, the use of the “national ethnicity” label cannot ultimately exclude the bulk of Swedish speakers, who were as loyal to the Finnish nation as the their Finnish speaking fellow citizens captured by the figure.

Vilnius was in 1926 a city clearly marked by two larger communities: Polish speakers and Jews. Yet it is hard to believe that at that moment no Lithuanians at all were living in what today is the capital of Lithuania. In other cases, such as Bucharest, Prague, and Sofia, the reliability of the statistical evidence we have at hand for the 19th century may be rather limited. Nonetheless, the table does give an excellent first approximation to a cultural map that would be radically altered during the first five decades of the 20th century.

When looking at the figures, one should keep in mind that they do not only depict the situation at the aggregate level. Often enough, the multilingualism of Eastern Europe's administrative and commercial centers found its reflection in individual biographies as well. We may think of writers such as Edith Södergran, a Swedish speaking Finn brought up in St. Petersburg, who wrote her first verses in German, before she produced her highly praised poetry in Swedish. Another famous case in point is Elias Canetti, an author with a Spanish – Sephardic family background, raised in a Bulgarian border town where he received his main instruction in German, the language he kept on using in his prose after escaping from the Nazis and moving from Vienna to London.

As Therborn (1995: 47) has put it, the long-running process of ethnic and cultural homogenization in Europe reached its peak around 1950.

The price paid in Central and Eastern Europe for approaching a standard thought of as “normal” in the West was particularly high. The paths to nation-state construction implied intense conflicts, frequent boundary changes, ethnic cleansing, and the expulsion of substantial segments of the former population of several countries. The holocaust perpetrated against the European Jews by the Nazis retains an extreme and singular character in a historical context marked by an obsessive and often violent striving for homogeneity.

With hindsight, if we face the long-term results, the success story of the European nation-state, a story referring to a mode of rule that combined the goals of territorial integration and cultural standardization, may be regarded to some extent a myth (as Charles Tilly (1992) has argued).

Moreover, in contrast with former times, diversity has nowadays become a pivotal normative reference in the official discourse of European integration: it is revealing, in this respect, that the European Union (EU) reads United in diversity. It is hard to deny, however, that cultural homogenization represented one of the dominant paradigms of European modernity, and it was an objective pursued by state makers and nation builders all over the continent. If we focus on the city level, it should be noted that only a few of Europe's capitals and metropolitan centers are officially multilingual, with this multilingualism being generally restricted to no more than two languages. I will take this point up in more detail in the next sections.

Against the background sketched out so far, the changes Europe has been experiencing during the last decades appear to be quite far-reaching. A secular trend has been reversed, especially if we consider the situation in West European cities. Here, the influx of migrants both from Europe's peripheries and from other continents has reintroduced heterogeneity.

This is largely reflected in the profound sociolinguistic transformation of many urban settings. At present, the picture is additionally complicated by the powerful expansion of English as a regular means of communication at the higher levels of society. Thus, in many cities, English is displacing the local vernacular in elite-dominated contexts. It may not be too much of an exaggeration to compare this new heterogeneity to former manifestations of cultural and linguistic diversity, which were characteristic of medieval towns and survived into the first half of the 20th century in many areas of the European East. In the big cities of Western Europe, the patterns of stratification and of linguistic differentiation tend to overlap again, at least when we look at the two ends of the social spectrum. The upper segments of the staff employed by transnational corporations, IT experts, bankers, as well as people working in research centers or universities often use English as their regular medium of communication. At the other end of the scale, we find the bulk of the immigrants from North Africa, South Asia, Turkey, and other regions of the globe, who continue to use their mother tongues, thereby giving languages such as Arabic or Turkish a significant weight on Western Europe's sociolinguistic scene. A trend often observed with a good amount of concern by the members of the local middle class is pointing towards a future that seems to come pretty close to our past.<sup>2</sup>

Apparently, the “new medievalism” – a concept introduced by social scientists who want to highlight the consequences of the successive uncoupling of territoriality, political control, and cultural identity we are currently experiencing – is leaving some of its most immediate traces in the sociolinguistic configuration of our urban spaces.

It is an open empirical question whether, regarding the second and third generation of migrants and the influx of new migrating groups, tendencies that work towards linguistic assimilation will prevail, or if language maintenance will turn out to be the rule and lead to a long-term stabilization of multilingual structures. The interplay of the dynamics of interna-

tional migration with the cultural hegemony attained by global English implies that the particular features of the local linguistic context will be a critical factor in shaping future developments. Thus, it may be plausible to hypothesize that the potential for the assimilationist pull of English in London will be stronger than the hegemonic capacity of, say, Swedish in Stockholm.<sup>3</sup> Generally speaking, however, it seems reasonable to assume that the new heterogeneity will leave a long-lasting imprint on the cultural landscape of most European cities. Such an assumption can be based both on structural grounds and on normative considerations.

On the structural side, the spread of new telecommunications and information technologies plays a central role. The availability of these technologies has created a broad range of new possibilities for sustaining collective identities on a non-territorial basis. Again, the most manifest cultural effects of a sweeping transformation can be witnessed in cities. In places like Berlin or Brussels it is no problem to receive several TV stations broadcasting, for instance, in Turkish via satellite or through the cable network. At the same time, even if the dominance of the English language in cyberspace is unquestioned, the Internet seems to offer smaller and dispersed language groups a solid infrastructure for creating new communicative networks that are templates for reproducing particular cultural identities across long distances. To the extent that they have become part of the emerging global informational society, European cities may experience a flourishing of “virtual ethnic communities” (Elkins 1997), of communities that will remain attached to their specific languages. In addition to virtual mobility, recent forms of migration also seem to imply an intensification of the real physical mobility of persons in time and space, thus entailing an intensification of direct interactions within collectivities dispersed across state borders and world regions. In the end, structural developments of this kind are contributing to a phenomenon well analyzed both by experts on migration and by social anthropologists: urban spaces are successively being transnationalized and integrated in the communication flows linking countries of origin to countries of destination.<sup>4</sup> This “transnationalization” has an evident linguistic component (Vertovec 2009: 70–72).

On the normative side, the main argument to be made is that pretensions to strive for a quick and complete linguistic assimilation of immigrant groups have lost much of the political appeal they may have had in former times. In the recent past, international organizations such as the UN and UNESCO have put great emphasis on securing an independent status for cultural rights, including linguistic rights, as a necessary complement to the civil, political, economic, and social categories of human rights. The impact of the new discourse on rights and recognition has been remarkably strong in many Western societies, where issues concerning the material dimensions of citizenship have become closely connected with questions related to the field of symbolic representation and cultural identity (Pakulski 1997).

European institutions defining transnational rights standards for the European Union, the Council of Europe, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have played a pioneering role with regard to this. It is true that the main targets of the regulating activities of these institutions have thus far been autochthonous groups that are entitled to be considered as regional or national minorities. Yet it appears to be increasingly difficult to draw a clear-cut demarcation line between the claims of collectivities of this kind and the claims of migrant groups who have become firmly established in their host countries. Accordingly, the cultural rights discourse is swiftly spilling over from old to new minorities, and Europe is facing a growing pressure to include migrants in its transnational minority rights regime.

Another significant element in this normative constellation is EU citizenship. It has an increasing importance for the regulation of education and schooling in the member states. In the context of intra-European mobility, EU member states are supposed to make concessions towards the protection of the linguistic and cultural identity of citizens who move across borders. From a normative perspective, then, to draw a discriminatory line between the children of EU citizens and the children of citizens from non-EU countries when the local school curriculum is adapted to the challenges of the new heterogeneity is a problematic strategy. At the same time, it is obvious that the right to preserve one's cultural identity and to maintain one's mother tongue has its most immediate institutional relevance in those urban zones where migrants are typically concentrated.



### **3. Urban multilingualism and its challenges: the examples of Helsinki and Barcelona**

Let me flesh out the general argument put forward so far with two empirical examples. They cannot obviously be taken as evidence that has been gathered following systematic criteria, nor allowing us to draw general conclusions.

What they do provide, though, is a basic illustration of the problems related with urban multilingualism in Europe today. The topic under scrutiny certainly deserves a good deal of detailed comparative research.

Accordingly, the issues that are going to be addressed in an exploratory way on the following pages might offer some hints for developing a more general focus of analysis, in spite of their being inserted in specific local settings.

Barcelona and Helsinki belong to the small group of European capital cities that stand in striking contrast to the general trend diagnosed by Therborn.

They resisted the push of homogenization and retained a multilingual profile that is a part of their institutional reality. This means that they are *de jure* and *de facto* bilingual cities, the two languages officially in use being Castilian (Spanish) and Catalan in the case of Barcelona; or Finnish and Swedish in the case of Helsinki.

Among the larger West European cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, only Brussels (institutionally bilingual in Dutch and French) and Dublin (Irish and English) have similar characteristics to Helsinki and Barcelona. In Dublin, however, the presence of Irish in everyday life has to a great extent a symbolic, basically *de jure* character. In practice, the city largely functions in English. I will also leave Brussels aside in my discussion of urban multilingualism. Although it would make sense to compare the Belgian capital to the other two cases in terms of its main socio-linguistic attributes, Brussels is different from Barcelona and Helsinki in two important respects: First, the massive influx of foreign population dates back to the 1960s, while the Mediterranean city and its Baltic counterpart only have registered a significant increase of immigration from abroad since 1995. Second, Brussels has unique characteristics as the semi-official capital of the European Union, as it hosts a substantial portion of a foreign

population who belong to the trans-European elite, an attribute for which there is no proper correspondence in Barcelona and Helsinki<sup>5</sup>.

To get back to our starting point, Helsinki and Barcelona appear to be particularly interesting laboratories for the study of the challenges connected with present-day multilingualism, because of their combining of a well-entrenched endogenous patrimony of linguistic diversity, together with the politics this patrimony has entailed, with new layers of exogenous linguistic differentiation introduced by recent waves of immigration.

Both cities are also subject to the impact of Europeanization, an impact that on the communicative side becomes palpable with the continuous spread of English as a trans-European lingua franca, which is being more frequently used not only at the level of high business, research, and academic networks, but also in service sectors such as tourism and commerce. We can thereby assume that in both Helsinki and Barcelona the linguistic cleavages of the past intermingle in intricate ways with the imprint of the new heterogeneity.

Let me now offer a rough first assessment of how this happens.

#### **4. Helsinki**

As the capital of Finland, Helsinki is the center of an officially bilingual country. This official bilingualism finds its foremost expression in public institutions, which are formally committed to functioning both in Swedish and in Finnish. In practice, this commitment is to a great extent regulated in correspondence with the number of citizens assigned to a language group at the local level. The respective figures follow the registered linguistic census data. Municipalities can be unilingual in either of the two languages, bilingual with Finnish as majority language, or bilingual with Swedish as majority language. Language provisions vary accordingly. Helsinki, with a substantial minority of Swedish speakers, is a bilingual municipality (Oikeusministeriö 2009).

The language question is linked in intricate ways with the history of Finnish nationalism. After independence (1917), the co-official status of Swedish was for some time contested by the more radical wing of the Fennoman

movement, but in the 1930s a consensus emerged, which has endured into the 21st century.<sup>6</sup> As a national language with a constitutional standing equal to Finnish, Swedish has been able to maintain such a high profile in schools, the state administration, and the public media that the Swedish-speaking Finns are often portrayed as a generously protected group by all comparative European standards. At the same time, however, linguistic census data show that the proportion of Swedish speakers has been declining since independence: while in 1920, the group comprised 11.0% of the Finnish population, the figure had gone down to 5.4% in 2009 (McRae 1999: 86)<sup>7</sup>.

The trend is even more palpable in Helsinki, a city that was more or less evenly bilingual around 1900, if we recall the evidence offered by Therborn (1995: 44). Five decades later, in 1950, this picture had already changed substantially, with a percentage of Swedish speakers at 19.0%. For 1980, the figure was 10.6%, and in 2010 it had dropped to 6.0%.<sup>8</sup> To explain this decline would require a thorough sociolinguistic analysis, which cannot be offered here. In a nutshell, the language dynamics in the capital are in line with the overall dynamics at the national level. The key point to be made in this context is that Finnish nationalism effectively succeeded in overcoming a situation of diglossia, in which Swedish was the language of “higher” communication, while Finnish was used in “lower” functional domains (Kraus 2008: 103–104). Laponce (1987: 33–42) has made the point that a non-diglossic bilingualism – that is, a bilingualism characterized by an equal social status of the two languages involved – tends to be unstable if language communities coexist within the same territory, ultimately giving way to a generalized dominance of the (demographically) stronger language.

This is what basically happened in Helsinki in the course of the 20th century.

Thus, one may conclude that even a very generous level of protection of a minority language is no automatic guarantee for the language’s long-term reproduction.

On the Swedish-speaking side, there have thus far not been many signs of discontent about the loss of demographic weight of Swedish in the capital area. The issue has an intricate character. On the one hand, the gradual supersession of the Swedish language by Finnish entails consequences for Swedish politics in Finland. Traditionally, the Svenska Folkpartiet

(SFP: Swedish People's Party), which acts as the main ethnolinguistic representative of the interests of the Finland Swedes, gets the bulk (that is around 70%) of its vote from Swedish-speaking citizens (McRae 1999: 192–194).<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, the relative decrease in the number of Swedish-speaking population poses an obvious threat for the political future of the SFP. On the other hand, in a system firmly dominated by the logic of consensus (Pesonen & Riihinen 2002: 285), the SFP has been able to play a significant role in decision-making both at the national and at the local levels. In legal terms, the frame of language policy is highly institutionalized, so that, all in all, Swedish does maintain a significant presence in public settings. In a bilingual municipality such as Helsinki, for instance, institutional bilingualism implies that there exists a full-fledged Swedish school circuit parallel to the Finnish one. To re-politicize the language issue against the background of demographic trends therefore entails an obvious risk from the Swedish angle, as it might lead to a general reassessment through which an officially national language might ultimately be declared a minority language. Since 1945, at the latest, the main rationale for language policies in Finland has been to avoid any exacerbation of linguistic strife by defining the country's linguistic diversity as a key element of national identity. Up to now, state institutions tend to embrace multilingualism as a positive feature of Finnish society, as a feature that contributes to giving Finland a competitive advantage vis-à-vis linguistically poorer environments. Against this background, we may define the Finnish approach towards linguistic diversity, which is also the approach adopted in the Helsinki area, as an integrative multilingualism.

What are the implications of integrative multilingualism when it comes to immigration? Finland only became a country of immigration in the 1990s, and even after that turning point Finnish immigration figures have remained low, compared to those of most other West European countries.

The number of foreigners registered in Finland in 2010 was 167,954, equating to 3.1% of the total population.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, immigration is largely an urban phenomenon. It is concentrated south of the axis between Tampere and Turku, the capital area in and around Helsinki attracting a substantial portion of the foreign population. Thus, in 2010, 7.2% of the people living in Helsinki were foreigners. To get a fuller picture, one has to add the Finnish citizens born abroad to this figure.

Overall, then, the speakers of non-domestic languages among the inhabitants of Helsinki at present make for 10.2% of the city population (Helsingin kaupungin tietokeskus 2010: 1, 6).

Around 150 languages are nowadays spoken in the Finnish capital. Most of the language groups are small, with only three languages breaking the threshold of 5,000 speakers. Among these three, the 13,000 Russian speakers constitute by far the largest language community. Russian is spoken by twice as many people as Estonian and Somali, the languages of the next two larger linguistic communities on the list of non-official language groups. In the case of Russian and Estonian, we are dealing with languages whose “home territories” are in close geographical proximity to the Helsinki area. It seems safe to assume that mother tongue use among Russian and Estonian-speaking immigrants is supported by the dense trans-border networks that exist between Helsinki, St. Petersburg, and Tallinn. The structures of migrant transnationalism that connect these locations have an obvious linguistic dimension and certainly contribute to the maintenance of Russian and Estonian in the capital of Finland<sup>11</sup>.

So do the local authorities, whose tendency is to apply the approach of integrative multilingualism with regard to the concerns of immigrant communities. On the website of the City of Helsinki’s Education Department, one finds a clear commitment to multiculturalism<sup>12</sup>, which may seem surprising enough in view of the general multiculturalist backlash that has been experienced all over Europe in the last decade<sup>13</sup>. While the Department emphasizes the importance of the acquisition of Finnish from the preparatory level, it also highlights its will to support the mother tongue skills of immigrant children. The support explicitly aims at mother tongue retention. With this purpose, schools provide two hours of complementary (i.e. extra-curricular) maintenance language instruction per week, which are financed by the municipality. To organize a group of pupils that receive instruction of their own language, a quorum of four participants is required. On this basis, as the Education Department is eager to point out, approximately 4,000 school children of immigrant origin received mother tongue instruction in Helsinki in 2010. About 40 languages were taught in the corresponding programmes, the largest language groups being Russian, Somali, and Estonian. The list of languages taught as maintenance language also includes Bengali, Uyghur, and two variants of Kurdish (Sorani and Kurmanji).

that even at the level of comprehensive schools children have the option to leave school equipped with four languages: Finnish; Swedish, which is compulsory as the other national language; English; and, finally, their mother tongue<sup>14</sup>.

This is a clear break with the principles of linguistic homogenization associated with the making of nation-states in Europe, as well as a departure from the agenda of assimilationism, at any rate in its linguistic form. One should not exaggerate the point: the dominance of Finnish in everyday communication in Helsinki remains unchallenged. At the same time, while Swedish retains its public presence, the weight of Russian as an immigrant language has grown considerably. Against this background, it is worth noting that English is playing an increasingly significant role as the *lingua franca* allowing for communication between different language groups.

Moreover, it is gaining additional strength due to the on-going “Anglicization” observable at the level of the institutions of higher education, as well as of the work routines of international firms.

Paradoxically, the recent dynamics may be undermining the very basis from which the approach of an integrative multilingualism once emerged, namely the consensus on conceiving of Finland as of a bilingual political community.

At any rate, in the urban setting of Helsinki, a setting that is of great importance for symbolically displaying the cohabitation of the two national languages, Swedish is to some extent being displaced by larger immigrant languages, such as Russian, and by English, which is becoming the standard *lingua franca* when Finns communicate with citizens of neighboring Nordic countries. The fact that the bulk of immigrant children in the Helsinki area experience their linguistic immersion in the host society through the Finnish-speaking school circuit puts additional demographic pressure on Swedish. It is in this convoluted situation that language is re-emerging as a salient political issue. Over the last couple of years, the question of whether Swedish should maintain its status as a national language, to be acquired at least at some basic knowledge level by all Finnish citizens irrespective of the linguistic composition of their area of residence, has become the subject of intense debates in the media (Saukkonen 2011). Parallel to this development, the populist True Finns party has begun to put more effort into reinvigorating the Fennoman cause, turning “compulsory Swedish<sup>15</sup>” into one of the main targets of their campaign against what they perceive

as alien to the “Finnish soul” and to “Finnish values”. A long tradition of institutional openness towards multilingualism is thereby exposed to risk of being eroded by the pressures of a resentful and ethnocentric identity politics.

## **5. Barcelona**

In political terms, the main difference between the two cities under scrutiny here is that Helsinki is the capital of a sovereign state, whereas Barcelona “only” hosts the governmental institutions of Catalonia. In the European press, Catalonia is often categorized as a “region”, and this is also the status it is assigned in the institutional context of the EU, where it is one of the, at present, 344 members of the Committee of the Regions. The majority of Catalan citizens, however, tend to conceive of their country as a nation, albeit a stateless one. Since 1980, Catalonia has the status of an Autonomous Community within the semi-federal structures of the Spanish state. In similar ways as the Scots or the Quebeckers, many Catalans aim at higher quotas of sovereignty, which are to be conquered either by obtaining additional space for self-government from Madrid, or by means of achieving independence.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, as an Autonomous Community provided with a substantial portion of devolved powers, Catalonia holds significant competences in the field of language policy, the main constraint to these lying in the fact that the Spanish constitution defines Castilian as the official language in the whole of Spain’s territory, other languages – that is, Basque, Catalan, and Galician – being given the option of sharing a co-official status with Spanish in the Autonomous Communities where they are spoken. Thus, as Finland, Catalonia has two official languages, Catalan and Castilian/Spanish.

Since the re-establishment of Catalonia’s autonomy after the end of the Franco dictatorship, the co-official status of Catalan has recurrently been a matter of political disputes. As the Catalan language was publicly banned and prosecuted by Spanish authorities for much of the 20th century, and underwent a long period of intense repression after the end of the Civil War and the conquest of Catalonia by Franco’s troops, the institutions of the Generalitat – as the Catalan government is officially called – have put (and continue to put) major efforts into improving its sociolinguistic standing.

The autonomy provisions define Catalan as Catalonia’s “own” language, thereby giving it a symbolically somewhat higher position than Spanish (Kraus 2007: 208). Whereas broadly accepted in Catalonia itself,

this approach has generated some animosity on the Spanish side, especially (but not exclusively) on the right wing of the political spectrum, where there is concern about the questioning of the hegemonic status which the Castilian language has enjoyed for centuries all over Spain by mobilized peripheries with distinct linguistic features, such as the Basque Country and Catalonia<sup>7</sup>.

Catalonia thereby applies a different model than Finland, where educational institutions are differentiated according to linguistic criteria. educational institutions are differentiated according to linguistic criteria. In contrast with Finnish, Castilian has a long record as a dominant language. The philosophy of Catalan language immersion programs has therefore been grounded on the premise that establishing a more balanced bilingualism in Catalonia requires special institutional support for Catalan (Balcells 1996: 189–190), a support given according to the logic of “positive discrimination”. In this respect, one can summarize that the forces of Catalanism – a term which is used here for denominating those actors, not necessarily all nationalists, who are supportive of the Catalan cause – aim at achieving an objective that was also prominent among Finns several decades ago, namely at overcoming a situation of diglossia that they consider unfair, as it entails an inequality of linguistic status between Spanish and Catalan.

Throughout the last decades, the language issue in Catalonia has been characterized by an extraordinarily high level of politicization. The parameters of language conflict are more intricate than in Finland, as “internal” factors interact with “external” ones. On the internal side, there is a remarkably strong consensus, shared by the bulk of the political parties represented in the Parliament of the Autonomous Community, on the priority of giving Catalan special protection, not least because of the structurally weaker position it has had vis-à-vis Spanish. On the external side, this view collides with the approach generally adopted by Spanish decision-makers in Madrid, who are not prepared to accept what they perceive to be a relegation of Castilian to a secondary role (Kraus 2007: 211–214). What ultimately explains the salience of linguistic issues in the Catalan context is that language occupies an important space on the battleground of two competing – and, as it actually seems, to some extent incompatible – nation-building projects: the objective of reframing Spain as one nation after the Franco dictatorship is challenged by Catalan aspirations for higher quotas of sovereignty. In consequence, language policies in Catalonia are largely determined by a context of conflictual multilingualism.



How does this conflictual multilingualism impact on the linguistic scenery in the city of Barcelona? In contrast with Finland, there are no proper census data on the linguistic identity of citizens in Catalonia. The political regulation of language issues is based on the assumption that bilingualism applies evenly over the Catalan territory. Still, language competence and language use have been scrutinized in numerous studies and surveys undertaken in autonomous Catalonia over the last three decades. As a comprehensive survey from 2008 shows, Catalan is the first language of 31.6% of the population of Catalonia older than 15 years; for Castilian, the corresponding figure is 55.0%<sup>18</sup>. When it comes to linguistic competence, according to the same survey, 94.6% understand Catalan, 78.3% speak it, and 61.8% can write it; for Castilian, the figures approach 100% for the first two competence levels, the writing competence being 95.6% (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 139, 142). It has to be noted that writing proficiency in Catalan increases considerably among younger age cohorts, as school instruction of Catalan was banned for most of the Franco period, but became successively normalized after 1975. Moreover, interestingly enough, there is no strict coincidence between the proportions of what people indicate as their “first language” and their “language of identification”: thus, 46.5% give Castilian as their language of identification, 37.2% Catalan, 8.8% both Catalan and Castilian, 2.4% Arabic, and 4.3% other languages (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 48).

When we focus on the metropolitan area of Barcelona, the figures do not deviate massively from Catalonia as a whole, although Castilian is stronger in the capital than in rural areas. In Barcelona, 24.7% indicate Catalan as their first language; the figure for Castilian is 63.1% (both Catalan and Castilian: 4.2%; Arabic: 1.8%; other languages: 5.5%). With regard to competence, 94.6% of the metropolitan population understand Catalan, 78.3% speak it, and 61.8% write it (Castilian: 100.0%; 99.9%; 96.7%) (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 45, 139, 142)<sup>19</sup>. The survey data demonstrate that, at the aggregate level, bilingualism has a more balanced profile in the conurbation of Barcelona than it has in Helsinki. Moreover, the use of two languages in everyday communication is an extended practice at the individual level too (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 57–82).

What can be said in terms of a first attempt at assessing how the “endogenous” patterns of bilingualism interact with the multilingualism introduced by immigration in Barcelona? Two aspects of immigration stand out in comparison with Helsinki. First, one has to be aware of the sheer quantitative dimensions of the phenomenon: from January 2001 to January 2010, the number of foreigners in Barcelona went up from 74,019 (4.9% of the total population) to 284,632 (17.6%). Evidently, the impact of immigration on the city’s demography has been massive. Second, if we look at the data for 2010, immigrants from Central and South America comprise 40.7% of the city’s foreign population <sup>20</sup>. The vast majority of these immigrants have Spanish as their first language, so that there is a significant overlap between “old” and “new” varieties of multilingualism in the Catalan capital. In difference to Helsinki, there is no immediate information about the linguistic affiliations of the city’s residents available for Barcelona. Still, the ranking of foreign nationals does offer some indirect evidence on the languages of the immigrant communities, and in view of the relative strength of citizens from North Africa and from Pakistan among the foreign population, one can conclude that Arabic and Urdu carry special weight in Barcelona’s changed multilingual setting (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2010: 116). Otherwise, the linguistic composition of the immigrant universe is as manifold as in Helsinki.

To assess the institutional response to the new multilingualism, we have to keep in mind that Barcelona differs from Helsinki in one very important respect: whereas in Finland, education and schooling are to a great extent a municipal matter, in Catalonia it is the Generalitat that holds key competences in the field of education. Thus, how multilingualism is regulated in the schools of Barcelona follows substantially from policies designed by the Department of Education of the Catalan government.

Yet, at the same time, the principles endorsed by this Department in its approach toward mother tongue instruction come very close to what we find at the local level in Helsinki. In general terms, the Departament d’Educació embraces multiculturalism and multilingualism as the appropriate means for creating positive models of coexistence for an increasingly diverse citizenry. In addition, great emphasis is placed on linking the sensitivity towards difference and the rejection of linguistic prejudice with the aim of achieving social cohesion<sup>21</sup>. Another specific aspect of the approach

developed for tackling multilingualism in Catalan schools is the explicit support shown for minority languages: when depicting the linguistic situation in the countries of origin of immigrant children, such as Morocco or Bolivia, special and extensive mention is made of Berber and Quechua.

This may be taken as a statement of intent based on the Catalans' own experience as a linguistic minority. To some extent, one might venture, the context of conflictual multilingualism reverberates in the field of organizing immigrant mother tongue instruction.

Against this background, similarly to all Catalan schools, the schools in Barcelona are also encouraged to offer extracurricular classes in foreign pupils' languages and cultures of origin both at the primary and at the compulsory secondary level. However, a key difference with Helsinki is that the institutional input, as defined in the regulations formulated by the Departament d'Educació, does not include the supply and the remuneration of teaching staff, but is essentially limited to providing school locations.

The financial funds for mother tongue instruction have to come from other (non-public) institutions or bodies. As a result, the scope of mother tongue instruction thus far remains modest. On an Education Department web page containing information about mother tongue instruction in the school period 2010–2011, we learn that nine languages have been on offer for extracurricular classes. The number of pupils in these classes totals 2,952<sup>22</sup>.

It has to be noted that the figure is for the whole of Catalonia.

There is no breakdown for the municipal level. Hence, given that in Catalonia, in contrast with Finland, immigration has affected the rural areas as heavily as the urban ones, we can extrapolate that the figure for Barcelona must be significantly lower<sup>23</sup>. The obvious conclusion is that Barcelona lags clearly behind Helsinki when it comes to setting up and implementing mother tongue retention programmes. The importance that is given to the fostering of an extensive multilingualism in official discourses is thus far not really matched by material efforts.

On the other hand, and, again, somewhat paradoxically, the salience of language conflict may contribute to how, in Catalonia, immigrants achieve a comparatively high level of effective proficiency in the two official languages.

A recent survey with data from 2010 shows that 40% within the population segment composed of those born abroad have learnt to speak Catalan (fundacc 2011). The figure can be considered rather impressive, if we take into account the linguistic background of the many immigrants from Latin America, and the lingua franca qualities of Castilian, which is spoken by virtually all Catalan citizens and serves as the vehicle of communication not only between Catalonia and Spain, but also between Catalonia and other parts of the world. The lingua franca role that English has in Finland is replicated to a considerable extent by Spanish in the Catalan case. Thus, the capacity of cultural penetration into allophone communities (including the Spanish speaking groups) exhibited by Catalan must be related to the weight this language carries as a symbol of political identification.

As in Finland, multilingualism in Catalonia is a phenomenon to stay.

It becomes manifest in varying combinations of “endogenous” and “exogenous” languages. On the “exogenous” side, English has to be added as an increasingly significant factor: an ever growing number of Catalans uses the emergent European lingua franca as their main external communication tool.

## **6. Citizenization as multilingualism**

By connecting the effects of the “new” heterogeneity and “old” cultural cleavages in particularly intricate ways, cities like Barcelona and Helsinki offer laboratory-like qualities for studying what transnationalism represents in environments where national identities of different types are still powerful forces (Calhoun 2007). The politics of multilingualism demonstrates how the national is “transnationalized”: think, for instance, of the multiple ways of relating established ethnolinguistic patterns of identification – Finnish versus Swedish, Catalan versus Castilian – to the new cultural and communicative practices introduced by immigrant groups.

In a parallel way, the politics of multilingualism is a politics that nationalizes the transnational: in the referendums on independence organized in a great number of Catalan municipalities by civil society actors between autumn 2009 and spring 2011, mobilizing (in Catalan) for immigrant participation was a strategic goal shared by all convoking local entities. Although the “hybridization” that is often associated with the dynamics of immigration may well change the parameters of identity politics, it apparently does not entail the waning of all cultural identities in a cosmopolitan pastiche of sorts.

What comes to the fore with the new heterogeneity in the settings of Barcelona and Helsinki is not just an exuberance of diversity, in the sense of a ubiquitous proliferation of interlocking, complementary, or interchangeable cultural and linguistic attachments. As we have seen, institutional attempts at coming to grips with the challenges of multilingualism rather involve a delicate exercise in defining the proper space for acquiring and using different linguistic competences. At the individual level, the situation to tackle may not be less demanding. To give one concrete example: the children of Moroccan immigrants with a Berber background in Barcelona will have to make substantial efforts to acquire a linguistic repertoire that “fully” corresponds to their equally multinational as transnational environment.

Such a repertoire would have to include Catalan, Spanish, Amazig, and Arabic, as well as ultimately English. This type of situation takes us far away from the one nation – one language – one state approach that was characteristic of the high time of European modernity. In cities like Helsinki and Barcelona, multilingualism and its politics are prime examples of the challenges posed by complex diversity. The concept underlines the multidimensionality and fluidity that diversity has attained in our societies.

Its use may therefore help us to avoid essentializing simplifications when we talk about culture and identity. Yet, at the same time, the concept of complex diversity also renders tribute to the relevance culturally embedded contexts of praxis – such as languages – continue bearing for articulating a reflective identity politics<sup>24</sup>. To the extent that the approach sketched out here holds, we may conclude that the situation in multilingual cities such as those discussed here is possibly more instructive for grasping the intricacies connected to the politics of diversity and transnationalism than the scenery offered by the somewhat stereotypical global urban settings of London, New York, or Toronto, where the link between the local and the global realms is

“naturally” established in English. Thus, our bringing complex diversity and multilingualism into focus ultimately confirms the old wisdom that “far away from where it’s at is where it’s at”.

How shall we tackle the challenges that multilingualism entails for urban politics? Where can we look for the foundations of a normative approach to the new heterogeneity that is both open to the legitimate articulation of diversity and able to overcome the risks of fragmentation? The first suggestion I would like to make in these final paragraphs is that the normative basis for formulating an appropriate political strategy for the multilingual city is recognition. Obviously, recognition here means primarily recognizing linguistic diversity. The very core of the potential to act as a citizen – be it in ancient Athens, in Renaissance Florence, or contemporary European cities – is formed by communicative resources. Citizens need to be equipped with such resources to be able to act in autonomous and enlightened ways, to participate in collective deliberation, and to influence decision-making, locally, nationally, and transnationally.

Our freedom as citizens is constituted through specific social practices, which by definition are linguistically embedded. Multilingual cities must be sensitive to this embeddedness and recognize the importance language has for the constitution of the personal/social identities of their inhabitants.

They should formulate a responsive approach when it comes to dealing with the particular needs of persons with diverse linguistic backgrounds in schools or in the organization of their public services.

In the end, the “politics of recognition” (Taylor 1992) is built on the evidence that the cognitive components of civic identities cannot be taken as something uniformly given. To overcome both cognitive and normative monism, we have to question the idea that there is one standard curriculum background. Hence, and this is my second observation, “citizenization” (Tully 2008: 310–314) and its institutional regulation must be regarded as a fundamental aspect of articulating a framework for political participation that is compatible with complex diversity. In view of the linguistic embeddedness of civic identities, the worth of languages reaches far beyond their instrumental functions. By just political standards, cities concerned with how to confront a diverse citizenry should open up to introduce varying combinations of a multilingual repertoire at the level of their institutions.

Recognition must not be taken as a means for segregating different groups according to their cultural attributes; nor has it to be conceived of as a principle thrown out to please group narcissisms camouflaged behind a multicultural rhetoric. In the sense that the concept is given in these brief normative considerations, recognition aims at working out an approach for dealing with the challenges of diversity that is primarily inspired by democratic motives. The openness of institutions for the articulation of different identities is meant, in the end, to be conducive to the creation of a shared civic space, which both respects and transcends diversity. Seen in this light, recognition becomes indeed the very precondition for sustaining processes of citizenization in contexts of urban diversity. This is so because recognizing different cultural and linguistic identities is not just a legitimate end in itself, but a decisive step for creating reciprocal attachments among those supposed to participate in the making of a vibrant public culture, a culture that will imply some common standards, including linguistic standards. However, it has to be emphasized that such standards must be developed without replicating the homogenizing logic that characterized the model of the European nation-state.

It should have become evident that in the framework of this article the concept of citizenship is used in its most literal sense: that is, citizens are people living in cities, and citizenization, accordingly, means to learn to be aware of the social and political implications of living together in a city. To the extent that cities are spaces made of difference, this awareness must include the realm of linguistic and cultural diversity. From such an angle, the dynamics of citizenization in our present urban contexts ultimately demand a further institutional uncoupling of citizenship rights and entitlements stemming from nationality. Eventually, the multilingual city may turn out to be the central site for establishing a more substantial citizenship regime in Europe, a regime that will combine a tolerant attitude towards the articulation of diversity in an interdependent world with the noble democratic goal of creating and reproducing a common public space.

## Acknowledgments

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## Notes

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*1. In the last few years, these questions have indeed increasingly become a more salient issue in the political debates on integration, naturalization, and citizenship in several European countries, irrespective of their particular trajectories in the field of immigration. For an overview of issues related to immigration and urban multilingualism in Europe see Extra and Yağmur (2004).*

*2. The medievalist Patrick J. Geary (2001: 40) observes: "[I]n the great cities of Europe (...) linguistic and cultural stratification once more characterizes both ends of the population's spectrum. At the top, major multinational corporations and scientific institutions operate largely in English with little regard for local language traditions. At the lower end of the social scale, these cities have experienced substantial growth in the numbers of people who trace their origins to Turkey, North Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and other parts of Asia. These immigrants live their lives speaking Arabic, Turkish, and other languages distant from those spoken by the Middle Class. These developments, which are greeted by hostility and fear as novel occurrences, are actually a return to a much more ancient pattern of ethnic diversity. Europe is indeed beginning once more to resemble its past."*

*3. At any rate, this is a conclusion one can draw when extrapolating from the analysis of language maintenance in the US (Fishman 1980).*

*4. See the assessment of the dynamics of transnationalization in Faist (2004). 6. McRae (1999: 55–82) gives a thorough overview of the impact of the linguistic cleavage on political developments in independent Finland.*

*5. The interplay of old and new layers of heterogeneity in Brussels is discussed by Favell and Martiniello (1999).*



6. McRae (1999: 55–82) gives a thorough overview of the impact of the linguistic cleavage on political developments in independent Finland.
7. Tilastokeskus (Statistics Finland). Available from: <[http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk\\_vaesto\\_en.html#structure](http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html#structure)>. [Last accessed 9.4.2011].
8. Tilastokeskus (Statistics Finland). Available from: <[http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak\\_en.asp](http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak_en.asp)>. [Last accessed 9.4.2011].
9. Grönlund (2011) offers an updated picture of the positioning of the Finland-Swedes in Finnish politics.
10. Tilastokeskus (Statistics Finland). Available from: <[http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk\\_vaesto\\_en.html](http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html)>. [Last accessed 9.4.2011].
11. See Vertovec (2009: 69–74) on types of socio-cultural competence linked to transnationalism.
12. Available from: <<http://www.helsinki.fi/hki/opev/en/Comprehensive+schools/Multicultural+education>>. [Last accessed 5.4.2011].
13. For discussions of this backlash from different perspectives see Brubaker (2003); Vertovec and Wessendorf (2009).
14. In Swedish speaking schools, the Finnish – Swedish sequence is inverted.
15. Pakkoruotsi, as the Finnish phrase has it. consequence of immigration. In 2008, the number of residents in Catalonia born abroad (i.e. outside of Spain) was 1,204,711 (16.4%). The migration cycle has come to a halt since then, so that demographic figures have only changed moderately.
16. See Requejo (2010) for an analysis of the recent turn from autonomism to independentism in Catalan politics.
17. Linz (1975) offers a thorough examination of the linguistic dimension of center – periphery conflicts in modern Spain.

18. The term used in the survey is *llengua inicial*; 3.8% indicate both Catalan and Castilian, 2.6% Arabic, 6.7% other languages (Generalitat de Catalunya 2009: 43). From 2001 to 2008, the Catalan population increased by 16.75%, basically as a consequence of immigration. In 2008, the number of residents in Catalonia born abroad (i.e. outside of Spain) was 1,204,711 (16.4%). The migration cycle has come to a halt since then, so that demographic figures have only changed moderately.

19. The metropolitan area includes both the city of Barcelona and its densely populated suburbs.

20. For the figures, see *Ajuntament de Barcelona* (2010: 11, 25).

21. See Annex 2 (Protocol for extracurricular classes in foreign pupils' languages and cultures of origin) to the Language and social cohesion plan introduced in 2007 by the Departament d'Educació. Available from: <[http://www.xtec.cat/lic/intro/docu-menta/annex2\\_extracurricularclasses.pdf](http://www.xtec.cat/lic/intro/docu-menta/annex2_extracurricularclasses.pdf)>.

22. Arabic leads the ranking, with 1,682 pupils. It is followed by Chinese (501), Portuguese (227) and Romanian (177). The list also includes Amazig/Berber (98) and Bengali (57). See Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d'Ensenyament, Servei de Llengües: *Llengües d'origen*. Presentació. Available from: <<http://blocs.xtec.cat/llenguadorigen/presentacio/>> [Last accessed 30.3.2011].

23. With its 1,620,000 inhabitants (2010), the city of Barcelona makes up approximately 22% of the Catalan population.

24. A systematic elaboration of the concept of complex diversity can be found in Kraus (2012).

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
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## 4. LANGUAGE: ETHNIC OR CIVIC ELEMENT?<sup>1</sup>

Núria Franco-Guillén

**Abstracts:** *this article reflects on the status of (minority) languages as a civic or ethnic element of national identity. It argues that rather than an ethnic or civic element in itself, it is important to consider the role of language within the nationalist discourse. In this sense, a discourse proposing language as a tool for equal opportunities can be considered civic, while situating language as a precondition for being regarded, as a member of the nation can be considered ethnic. By using the example of the discourses on immigration in Catalonia, the article shows how this analytical distinction is relevant to conclude whether a given minority nationalism is civic or ethnic.*

**Keywords:** stateless nationalism, minority languages, ethnic civic distinction, immigration, Catalonia.

The arrival of immigration to territories where minority languages co-exist with state-wide languages raises the question of whether newcomers will learn and use it. In many cases, the adoption of such languages by people with an immigrant background and its implications go beyond a desire for preserving linguistic diversity. In the contrary, minority languages tend to be one of the main features of minority nationalism, and its preservation becomes intertwined with matters of power relations.

It is important to point at conceptual vagueness as a common problem in the study of fields such as nationalism, immigration and languages. In any of each one must clarify what exactly is our subject of study. For instance, the – often unclear – delimitations of borders have a key influence to consider the extent of the nation, the language, and whether a person is an immigrant or not. In the case of stateless nations conceptual vagueness stems from the very questioning of the concept of nation, in addition to the common association to ethnicity. Thus, ethnonational minority, regional minority, minority nations or national minority are terms often used to refer to the same cases, such as Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country or Catalonia. Accordingly, their politicised movements have also received several names. What most of these cases have in common is that they are political peripheries in struggle with a centre often against assimilation. This struggle takes place in the form of difference, distance, and dependence or, as in the words of Rokkan and Urwin's seminal work (1983), *Identity, Territory and Economy*. This piece focuses on identity.

As Favell (2003) noted, the way a nation responds to immigration is intimately related to the way it is self-understood. In the case of stateless nations, with insufficient powers to deal with these issues, some scholars predicted a rejection of immigration under the assumption that immigrants tend to integrate to the minority nation (Kymlicka 2001). Rather than a rejection, it becomes interesting to analyse the elements of (minority) nationalism that emerge in their discourses on immigration, how these relate to certain stances, and to what extent immigration and the definition of the nation are paired.

When analysing the way nationalism is deployed in responses to immigration, the most commonly typology used is the ethnic / civic distinction, having as precedents Meinecke's distinction between *Staatsnation* and *Kulturnation*, and Kohn's work (Brubaker 1996). In general, the civic form of nationalism refer to the one characterised as by using a subjective definition (based on


socio-economic features) that excludes the other criteria and insists on a free will of the individuals in order to determine membership, in contrast to the ethnic form of nationalist, which uses cultural, linguistic, religious or ethnic criteria to determine this more objective membership. Despite its analytical usefulness and value, the typology has been widely used and criticised. A first problem of this distinction is that it has been used to assert that ethnic nationalism is illiberal, while the civic one is more liberal. A second problem, relevant to the present piece of work, is that some authors have noted that this classification is not suited to account for how elements of culture intersect in the two forms of nationalism. Indeed, language is a problematic element when trying to determine whether it is a civic or an ethnic element.

While many of the aspects highlighted in the typology can be easily classified as elements such blood or race on the one hand can be hardly changed, and belonging in civic terms only depends on the will of the individual, language is an element that can be transmitted by family, but at the same time can be learnt and adopted by the individual. Thus, making it fall exclusively in one of the two possibilities can lead to analytical biases. This is especially the case if one aims at analysing elements of nationalism within stateless nationalist discourses on immigration, for the language tends to be at the heart of most of them, often being used to distinguish from the majority nations. In contrast, state-wide nationalism can give for granted the status of their state-wide languages and thus put emphasis in other aspects of the majority nation (such as respect for civic values).

If we take, for example the case of the main stateless nationalist parties in Catalonia, CiU and the ERC<sup>2</sup>, the following table shows the number of ethnic and civic nationalist elements in their discourses on immigration between 1999 and 2010, when using the classical distinction where language is just an ethnic element of the nation.




Graph 1. The ethnic and civic elements of nationalism. 1999-2010.



*Source: Own elaboration*

However, given that language is not a static element like blood, one could consider, rather than determining whether it appears or not, analysing in which terms CiU and ERC speak about language. In this sense, we proposed to look at whether language is represented in ethnic terms, meaning that parties could chose to present Catalan language as a pre-condition for being considered Catalan, or could alternatively present the Catalan language as a means for ensuring equal opportunities. The analysis was done in this sense, and the frequencies of ethnic and civic elements of the nation changed notably. In the case of ERC, the ethnic elements were reduced to seven mention in three legislative period.

Graph 2. Ethnic and civic nationalism distinguishing the function of language. 1999-2010



Source: own elaboration based on Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero (2014).

Language proves to be a problematic element for the ethnic / civic distinction, as it hardly falls entirely in any of the sides. For an analysis of nationalism to be able to offer an in-depth overview of its characteristics, certain degree of qualitative flexibility should be introduced. In this sense, instead of counting whether language appears or not an placing in any of the sides of the dichotomy, analysing how language is portrayed within political discourse can offer greater insights about what type of nationalism deploys a given actor.

## Notes

1. This note is a reflection on the ethnic / civic distinction and how the author dealt with it during her own research. The results can be found in Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero (2014)

2. Right wing nationalist former coalition *Convergència i Unió* and left wing nationalist, *Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya*. Please refer to Franco-Guillén and Zapata-Barrero (2014) for methodological details.

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## 5. THE FRISIAN LANGUAGE AND MIGRANTS

**Cor van der Meer**

**Abstract:** *In this article the role and functions as well as the projects and fields of research of the Mercator Research Centre is explained. Furthermore the linguistic situation in Fryslân is elaborated upon. After that the situation of migrants and refugees in Fryslân in the context of the Frisian language is described.*

### **Mercator European Research Centre on Language Learning and Multilingualism**

The Mercator European Research Centre was founded in 1987 on an initiative of the European Commission with the goal of stimulating EU Member States and the European Commission to take positive action in order to recognize regional and minority languages. It focused on documentation on education in minority education and cooperated closely with Mercator Media in Wales and Mercator Legislation in Barcelona. Until 2006 Mercator was funded by the European Union.

From 2007 onwards Mercator made a transition towards an information and research centre, instead of documentation and information centre, on the field of language learning. Currently, the province of Fryslân funds the Mercator centre. Furthermore, the European Commission as well as authorities of other regions in Europe fund several projects. Mercator is part of the Fryske Akademy, the scientific research centre of Fryslân covering the fields of language, history and society.

The Mercator European Research Centre on Multilingualism and Language Learning (Mercator Research Centre in short) aims at the acquisition, circulation and application of knowledge. Mercator gathers and mobilises expertise in the field of language learning at school, at home and through cultural participation, in favour of linguistic diversity in Europe. The Mercator Research Centre is an independent and recognised reference centre for policy makers and professional workers in the field of multilingual education and language learning. Mercator's goal is to bring Europe to Fryslân and Fryslân to Europe.

In order to reach this goal, the main activities of the research centre are: research, the production of publications and databases (for example the publication of regional dossiers with a description of the position of a minority language in the educational system of a state and our database of experts), Mercator's Network of Schools (which includes more than 90 bi-lingual or multilingual schools in over 20 minority language areas), spreading Newsletters (with over 2000 subscribers), regularly organizing and attending conferences and seminars (the yearly organised Mercator symposia are a well-known example of this) as well as taking an advisory position in matters related to multilingualism and language learning.

Additionally, Mercator has a fairly extensive website, on which one can find a lot of information about Regional and Minority Languages. All our public publications can be found there. The website has about 3.000 unique visitors every month.

The fields of research Mercator is currently active in are:

- A language survey which is conducted every 15-20 years in the Province of Fryslân;
- Trends in Policies and Practices for Multilingualism in Europe, often resulting from comparative research

- Application of the CEFR (Common European Framework of References) and the ELP (European Language Portfolio) in Europe
- Early Language Learning
- New technologies; investigating opportunities & developments such as Open Educational Resources/Open Educational Practices, but also different forms of e-learning, for example via a MOOC (Massive Open Online Course)
- Additionally, Mercator focuses on what an important role Social media can play in language learning and language use.

Mercator has identified a need for documents, which give a brief outline of the most essential features of the educational system of regions with an autochthonous lesser-used language. With the establishment of Regional dossiers we intend to meet this need. This is especially significant for policy makers, researchers, teachers, students and journalists that want to assess the developments in European minority language schooling. Currently, over 40 regional dossiers are freely available at the website

Mercator is the leading partner of the European Mercator Network, which at the moment has six partners; Mercator Media at the university of Wales, Mercator legislation, Ciemen in Barcelona, CUSC at the university of Barcelona, the University of Stockholm in Sweden and the Research Institute for Linguistics in Budapest, Hungary. The Mercator network works closely together, mainly through projects funded by the European Union, in EU programmes such as the Life Long Learning Programme.

Besides being part of the Mercator Network, Mercator closely cooperates with The Network for the Promotion of Linguistic Diversity (NPLD), the European Centre for Modern Languages (ECML), the OSCE, SOAS (UCL) in London and several regional authorities like the Bunjevac community and the Basque government

## **Language Situation in Fryslân**

The Frisian language is spoken in the province of Fryslân in the northern part of the Netherlands. The province is inhabited by about 650.000 inhabitants and about half of them can be considered as first-language or mother tongue speakers of Frisian. The Frisian language tree has

three trees, the Western Frisian variety, the East- or Sater Frisian variety and the Northern Frisian variety, the last two varieties both in Germany. The Frisian language belongs to the family of Germanic languages. In the province of Fryslân also several dialects are spoken in different part of the province.

Frisian and Dutch are both spoken in the province of Fryslân, where Dutch as the official national language has the highest prestige. Frisian has an official status in the Netherlands as the second official language of the state. Its spelling has been standardised and Frisian is used in several domains of Frisian society, thereby breaking through the dominance of Dutch. Apart from domains such as the judiciary, public administration, radio and television, the Frisian language can also be used within the province for education.

The linguistic situation is monitored by the province of Fryslân with a regularly ‘quick scan’. The Fryske Akademy carries out an extensive language survey at the moment (2014 – 2017).

	1967	1980	1994
Understand	97	94	94
Speak	85	73	74
Read	69	65	65
Write	12	11	17

We can see that the understanding of the language stays quite stable. However, still only a small percentage of the Frisians are able to write in their mother tongue.

The role of Frisian in primary education dates back to 1907 when the provincial government offered a grant to support Frisian lessons after regular school hours. Frisian was then taught as an extra-curricular subject.

In 1950, nine primary schools began to experiment with bilingual education and in 1955 bilingual schools obtained a legal basis. Frisian became an optional subject throughout primary school and the use of Frisian as medium of instruction was allowed in the lower grades. By 1959 the number of bilingual schools had risen to 47. Since 1980 Frisian has been taught in all primary schools, both public and private.

Together with other regions with lesser-used languages within the European Union, special projects have been initiated in the field of trilingual education. In 1997 seven schools in Friesland started a tri-lingual project. Three languages are used as medium of instruction: Frisian, Dutch and English. This network of tri-lingual schools grew through the years and at the moment the network consists of around 70 trilingual schools, which is about 15% of all primary schools.

The division of the languages used in trilingual schools differs from school to school, but in general the following model is used:

- Group 1-6: 50% Frisian, 50% Dutch.
- Group 7-8: 40% Frisian, 40% Dutch, 20% English.

However, this schedule was used in the beginning of the project, with a very strict division of languages. Nowadays schools offer English language at an earlier stage.

### **Migrants in Fryslân**

In 2015 close to 50.000 refugees arrived in the Netherlands and 10% of them arrived in the bilingual province of Fryslân; about 25% of them from Syria, but also big groups from Afghanistan and Iraq. We can by estimation say that overall around 10% of the inhabitants in Fryslân are currently migrants. This does not include Dutch people that came from other provinces to live in Fryslân.

Normally refugees are placed in several locations in the Netherlands and Fryslân, sometimes for one or two nights, sometimes for a few weeks or in some cases a few months. Refugees are moved a lot in the country. Therefore the bond with a place, province or regional language is very weak, including the link with the regional language.

In emergency shelters a lot of effort is done by volunteers to teach adults and children the basics of the Dutch language. A lot of these volunteers are resigned schoolteachers, but also students and other volunteers.

This is however not official education.

Refugee children are considered to fall under the education law of the Netherlands, which applies for all children, including refugee children.



go to the regional school where they are also integrated with Dutch and Frisian speaking children. In this way refugee children can be quickly confronted with the Frisian language. For adults however the Frisian language does not play a role, because they are moved a lot around the country and there primary focus is on learning the Dutch language for future perspectives.

Once the refugees have been acknowledged as official refugees, they can go to an asylum seeker centre. In those centres they can get education and language lessons. Children can then also go to regular primary schools or to International Connecting Classes (ISK) for secondary level education where refugees receive specific (language) education.

If the current refugees are placed somewhere more structural, for example in a small Frisian village, they almost surely will be confronted with the Frisian language and might also want to learn the language.

However, no official documentation or research exists about this topic.

When we talk about future directions the trilingual education model offers a lot of opportunities also for teaching to migrants. The model is good in its attempts to deal with the regional diversity. Nevertheless, within the growing diversity something else is needed. The strict division of languages needs to be replaced with a more interactive and perhaps playful model. We can see some good examples in Germany, Austria and Catalonia.

Concerning linguistic diversity and policy, it is very important to take into account the language migrants already know. This helps migrants to learn a new language, appreciates the value of their mother tongue and encourages them to pass the language on to their children. There is a need to describe the language needs of migrants, because this might differ between individuals. Furthermore, the diversity of migrant populations needs to be taken into account.

## **Conclusions**

We need to think about new models of schooling where the whole linguistic repertoire can play a role. Models for multilingual classrooms, where also the mother tongue of migrants can have a place. This is

especially important for regions where other languages are spoken besides the state language. Of course also affects the teacher skills and the teaching material. Teachers need to function as (multilingual) role models. As Regional- and Minority Languages (or minoritized languages) in Europe we need to work together in order to learn from each other through exchange of knowledge, experiences and good practices to find solutions for the challenges we are facing in Europe.

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- UNESCO, several publications, see [www.unesco.org](http://www.unesco.org)



## **6. IN-MIGRATION, IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION INTO WELSH-SPEAKING WALES\***

**Dr Catrin Wyn Edwards**

### **Introduction**

International immigration has indeed played a vital role in the development of a multicultural Wales since the end of the 19th century, making Cardiff one of the oldest multi-racial, multicultural communities in Britain. Despite this, in 2011, only 5.5% of Wales' 3.1 million population was born outside the UK (Migration Observatory, 2014: 4). This means that Wales has a smaller number and population share of non-UK born resi-

dents than Scotland and all the regions of England except the north-east of England (ibid. 2). The majority of non-UK born residents reside in urban areas of south Wales, notably Cardiff, the capital, Swansea and Newport (ibid. 6).

The very urban nature of the population movement means that it does not necessarily impact upon the sustainability of the Welsh language in the areas where the language has traditionally been at its strongest, notably in the rural areas of Wales. This does not mean that the Welsh language community in urban Wales is not thriving. Indeed it is; the results of the 2001 and 2011 census showed that Cardiff was one of the only local authorities where there was a clear increase in the number of speakers (Statistics for Wales, 2012, 7).

However, if the focus is on the manner in which migration has impacted and continues to impact on the sustainability of the Welsh language, then it is necessary to consider that of in-migration from other parts of the UK.

Between 1999 and 2011, there was a net inflow of migrants to Wales from the rest of the UK of around 6, 500 people per year on average. Between 2007 and 2011, north Wales showed the largest average net migration (Statistics for Wales, 2013).

This subject is a very sensitive and politicised issue in Wales (Edwards, 2016). The fact that those moving to areas of Wales speak English, the other de facto official language in Wales and have this in common with the majority of Welsh citizens, the fact that the Welsh language is a minority language spoken by only 19% of the population (Statistics for Wales, 2012), and the fact that, until recently, the Welsh language has been a cause of political tension, means that discussions surrounding the effects of in-migration on the sustainability of the language have led to controversies<sup>1</sup>. It is clear that no political party in Wales has taken ownership of the discussion on in-migration. In fact, even the Welsh Language Board, the main body responsible for language planning in Wales until its dissolution in 2012 was reluctant to discuss the subject publicly. The nature of the discussion has impeded policy formulation and implementation on a national level in the field of migrant integration (Edwards, 2016).

Despite this, there is a level of understanding amongst certain policy-makers, politicians and practitioners that in-migration represents one of the

main factors undermining the sustainability of the Welsh language, especially in the areas where has traditionally been a high density of Welsh language speakers. Welsh Government language strategies such as *Iaith Pawb* (2003) and *Iaith Fyw: Iaith Byw* (2012) refer to in-migration:

In recent decades, the demographic trends in Welsh-speaking areas have been for young people to leave, to be replaced, if at all, by the in-migration of older, non-Welsh speakers. These trends have an adverse effect on the social and economic balance of the community and there are serious associated implications for the Welsh language, since the young leavers take with them the future of the language in those areas (Welsh Government, 2003: 32).

The Welsh Government has stated that between 1,200 and 2,200 fluent Welsh-speakers are currently lost every year, and that this is mainly due to the difference in the number of fluent Welsh speakers emigrating from Wales, and the number in-migrating to Wales. The decrease in the percentage claiming to be able to speak Welsh on a Wales-wide level in the 2011 Census raised many concerns regarding the Welsh language.

However, the influence of this phenomenon is not new to policy-makers, practitioners, Welsh-language speakers and learners, or indeed anyone who wishes to see the language protected or revitalised. While there may be a lack of discussion on a national level in Wales, a number of measures and strategies have been put in place on the level of the local authority in Wales, notably in the field of statutory education to integrate newcomers.

### **Gwynedd Council**

One of these local authorities is Gwynedd. According to the 2011 Census, 65.4% of Gwynedd's population is able to speak Welsh (Gwynedd Council, 2014: 5). Over the decades, Gwynedd Council has led on initiatives in the field of language-in-education policy to integrate children of in-migrants and has provided firm guidance to other local authorities, policy-makers and practitioners working in Welsh language communities to integrate in-migrants.

During the 1970s, education inspectors, policy-makers and teachers in Gwynedd became aware of the fact that the presence of English-speaking in-migrants was having a significant effect on the Welsh language in the county (Humphreys, 2000: 146). Trends such as counter-urbanisation,

second-home tourism and retirement were the main drivers of this population movement, and Welsh-medium rural schools faced a great challenge in dealing with the arrival of many non-Welsh speaking children (Edwards, 2014).

### **Children, Young People and the Statutory Education System**

In 1975, Gwynedd Council adopted its first language-in-education policy and declared that the policy objective would be to achieve balanced, age related bilingualism and ensure that non-Welsh speaking students would acquire and use Welsh in both primary and secondary school<sup>2</sup>. There was the critical mass of speakers to ensure this and there was the political will to undertake such measures (Morris, 2000: 565)<sup>3</sup>. The council initially established a team of peripatetic teachers in 1978 to teach Welsh to groups of learners in schools. However, it became clear that more concrete measures were needed and, in 1984, the council opened a number of 'Language Centres for Latecomers' across the county. The aim was to teach Welsh to non-Welsh speaking pupils aged between 7 and 11 years old in an immersive manner for a school term before they returned their local Welsh-medium language schools (Humphreys, 2000: 146-47).

These 'Language Centres for Latecomers' continue to play an important role in the linguistic integration of non-Welsh speaking pupils and provide an intensive course in Welsh for latecomers to enable them to assimilate into the bilingual community and fully participate in bilingual education experiences. There are now four primary centres and one secondary centre, which support the council in implementing the current language policy.

A maximum of 18 pupils attend the primary school centres for a period of 12 weeks. The pupils are mainly aged between 7 and 11 and are latecomers to the county. They attend an intensive course for a term to immerse and prepare them to receive most of their schools. The course enables the pupils to return to schools in their area and follow their curriculum through the medium of Welsh. The pupils in the secondary centre are also immersed with an intensive course in Welsh in a short time. Other subjects are also provided through the medium of Welsh. To ensure appropriate progression at the schools, there is also post-care teacher who ensures that pupils receive appropriate follow-up upon their return to the local schools.

An immersion scheme has also been established at one secondary school in the county which provides a taster period for primary school pupils with a follow-up of intensive attention at the start of secondary school for pupils who have little grasp of Welsh. This encourages pupils who would perhaps not have chosen Welsh in the secondary to continue their education through the medium of Welsh/bilingually (Gwynedd Council, 2016).

Estyn, the Inspectorate for Education and Training in Wales, the Welsh Language Board and the Welsh Government have recognised Gwynedd's model as offering the best model for immersion education in Wales. Compared to other education models in Wales that teach pupils for three days a week for a period of two terms, Gwynedd Council's intensive teaching results in the pupils reaching a suitable level of proficiency and helps them to adapt to their new environment, whilst also making educational progress at the same time.

## **Challenges**

The centres are effective and are popular amongst pupils and parents alike owing to the friendly and family environment created. However, language-in-education policy-makers and teachers face many challenges.

These include, *inter alia*, building upon the linguistic development made in the centres as the children return to their Welsh-medium primary schools and ensuring continuity from the primary school to the secondary school. Another challenge is that some schools are traditionally considered as being more anglophone and there is a sensitivity in some schools in relation to over-promoting Welsh in some schools, so as not to alienate parents (Gwynedd Council / Trywydd, 2014: 4; Edwards, 2014). Some schools are more popular with non-Welsh speaking parents than others, especially in areas where there is a high level of in-migrants. This hinders Gwynedd Council's aim of creating fully bilingual citizens (Edwards, 2014). Therefore, while the education model ensures that pupils possess Welsh language skills, this is not sufficient to ensure that they continue to follow Welsh-medium education and that they become fluent and confident Welsh speakers. The presence of English-speaking pupils also influences language patterns in Welsh-medium schools, especially in school where pupils from Welsh-speaking homes are in the minority (Gwynedd Council / Trywydd, 2014; Thomas & Jones, 2011).

A recent intervention in the field of language use is Gwynedd's Primary Schools' Welsh Language Charter. The Charter was developed as a result of research undertaken that revealed that the Welsh was not sufficiently used in the canteen and in the school yard. The aim of the Charter is to promote social use of the Welsh language, by children and young people and nurture positive attitudes towards the language. The Charter incorporates the whole educational community and parents, governors, dinner staff and caretakers are responsible for promoting a healthy attitude towards increasing the social use of the Welsh language (Gwynedd Council, 2014: 16-17).

The council also views the development of parents' skills and attitudes as crucial to the child's success in acquiring Welsh. Recently, the 'Welsh for the Family' course was launched, giving parents an opportunity to learn Welsh at beginners level. In addition, increased collaboration is expected between the Welsh for Adults Centres in north and mid Wales to meet the requirements of the Welsh Language Charter (Gwynedd Council, 2014: 15). Another strategy to deal with the effects of in-migration is that of community empowerment (Edwards, 2016; Gwynedd Council, 2014: 20). In-migration to Gwynedd has led to a variation in the percentage of Welsh speakers across the county; while in some areas up to 87% of the population speak Welsh, in other areas as little 32% population speak Welsh (Gwynedd Council, 2014: 5). There is an awareness that inward and outward migration has a significant impact on the Welsh language and the social networks that are maintained locally. By striving to empower and support the existing Welsh speakers in these communities through a number of projects, the aim is to arrest out-migration and ensure that the communities are less vulnerable to the effects of in-migration. Significant attention is given to areas where the status of Welsh and social use of the language is low and the council is working with a group of local representatives to increase Welsh language activities in these areas (Gwynedd Council, 2014).

Gwynedd Council, therefore, is very much aware of the challenges it faces in terms of teaching Welsh to newcomers. However, the council's ambitious objective of ensuring that all pupils in the county possess appropriate language skills in Welsh and English, in order for them to become full members of the bilingual community to which they belong only goes part of the way in ensuring that the children of in-migrants are integrated.



There is a need to translate this language ability into social use. Despite this, there is the political will on a local level in Gwynedd which means that the strategies are formulated with a long-term view and as part of a wider vision for the sustainability and vitality of the Welsh language.

### **Provision for Adults and the Non-Statutory Education System**

The Welsh for Adults Centres who are the main providers of Welsh language lessons for adults in Wales do not explicitly differentiate between in-migrants and non-Welsh speaking Welsh in their provision. However, there are a number of projects that take place on a community level to try to attract in-migrants to learn Welsh. These often involve local councils, Welsh for Adults Centres and local language organisations. These projects aim to provide information regarding community life and 'Welsh for Adults' courses, raise awareness of the Welsh language and encourage in-migrants to attend cultural activities. Some of the courses or classes focus on the family and are based on the fact that their children are already receiving Welsh-medium education. By providing language and culture awareness sessions to families, the hope is to facilitate and encourage their integration into the Welsh language community and emphasise the crucial role that parents play in supporting their children's learning in Welsh-medium or bilingual education (Edwards, 2016).

### **WSOL (Welsh for Speakers of Other Languages) and ESOL**

Approximately 3% of the adult population living in Wales have neither English nor Welsh as their first language (Welsh Government, 2014: 5).

According to the Welsh Government, in 2011-12, there were 7,490 learners undertaking ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) learning aims at Further Education Institutions in Wales <sup>4</sup>. The majority of these learners are concentrated in Cardiff, Newport, and Swansea in south Wales, and Wrexham in north Wales. Welsh Government research has identified significant issues in ESOL provision in Wales such as insufficient funding, variations in the quality of delivery and the inflexibility of the provision (Welsh Government, 2014). Despite this, the ESOL provision is far more accessible than Welsh as a Second Language. According to the Welsh Government:

*The Welsh Language Learning ESOL in Wales can provide learners with a greater challenge. Recognising and understanding Welsh place names and signs can be difficult, especially when English is ‘alien’ as well. Providers need to be conscious of this and help learners to understand the differences. Being a bilingual society provides a richness that can make learning English all the more interesting, and providers are encouraged to integrate the Welsh language into their ESOL classes where possible (2014: 7).*

Students learn some basic Welsh on some ESOL courses, such as how to introduce themselves, ask after someone’s health and count to ten. They also learn about Welsh history and the advantages of learning and using Welsh in Wales. There is some mention of Welsh language provision and sustainability in relation to immigration in the Welsh Government strategy ‘Getting On Together - A Community Cohesion Strategy for Wales’ (2009), but in general Welsh classes for adults is deemed optional. Therefore, while Wales is a bilingual nation and the Welsh language is an official language, English and Welsh are not treated equally in terms of language provision for those who have neither Welsh nor English as a mother tongue. Unlike ESOL, which offers a clear framework for people who have neither English nor Welsh as a mother tongue to learn English, there is no equivalent in Welsh. It could be argued that this undermines the very discussion of linguistic equality between both languages, and sends out a mixed message to those arriving to Wales and want to be part of a thriving Welsh language community regarding the role and importance of the Welsh language on a social, economic and personal level.

## Notes

*\* Not to be cited without the author’s permission.*

*1. See Williams (1998: 102) and Jones and Williams (2000: 138) for more on tensions surrounding the Welsh language.*

*2. Although the policy’s overall objective is bilingualism, the balance is in favour of Welsh during the early years so as to establish firm foundations for further development. At the other key stages, schools are expected to plan purposefully so as to develop pupils’ grasp of Welsh and to ensure the development of Welsh as a subject and learning medium from pre-school age onwards.*


*3. According to the 1971 Census (in the period before local government reform in 1974) Gwynedd encompassed Anglesey, Caernarfon and Meirionnydd. The population of Welsh-speakers were 65.7%, 62% and 73.5% respectively (Aitchison & Carter, 2000: 51).*

4. ESOL is the term used for provision for learners whose first language is not English or Welsh. These learners have for various reasons come to live in the UK (Welsh Government, 2014: 4).

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## 7. A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE CHALLENGES FOR THE BASQUE LAN- GUAGE IN THE FACE OF IMMIGRATION.

**Xabier Aierdi Urraza**

**Abstract:** *minority languages face ever more complex challenges, especially when a new wave of immigration to a language's geographical area brings new languages with it. In any case, potential threats to the Basque language will not come from these languages, but rather from Spanish, French and English. In order to deal with these threats it is essential to identify geographical and social - through social class analysis - breathing spaces.*

Regarding immigration there are two facts that cause concern in the Spanish State. The first is that 1.2 million immigrants are unemployed. The second is that 700,000 boys and girls, the children of immigrants, are in the education system. These two facts must be brought into perspective in the southern Basque country. Both challenges – unemployment and education – are extremely important here, as achieving successful adjustment in both the receiving society and the immigrant community is fundamental for social integration and immigrant incorporation in the short and mid term. Education plays an important role in social mobility, a significant part of which involves language: in our society, the Basque language.

In general, the flow of immigration has been stopped and will not start again in the near future. Immigration to our community is closely tied to the need for care workers and, as such, the incoming contingents are largely made up of women and their numbers depend on the confidence and security of our established middle classes. A perceived lack of economic stability will not stimulate immigration. In addition, it is always the receiving society that chooses and the women called for are mostly South American and European.

All of this brings with it another incognito. Our national parameters occur within an abnormal situation and just when there had been an increase in the number of people who knew the language, which was undergoing a revival process, there was an influx of another 200,000 people to the area and it would seem that we need to start from scratch again. Moreover, a large part of that new population speaks a language which was already dominant, namely Spanish. That is a worry for the original population.

Eight years ago Ikuspegi and UNESCO House presented a study which found that 110 different languages are known in our geographical area.

That is not to say that those languages are used. A speaker might know the language but may not have a large enough community to be able to practice it. In any case, does that corpus of languages pose a threat or a challenge to the current situation of multilingualism? It is important in linguistic pluralism, but Basque will not really find collaboration/competition in these languages, but rather in Spanish and English. Any other language will have to be dealt with by increasing pluralism and facilitating and developing its use in the most democratic way possible, but in itself this will not bring about any new cultural or political problems.

Conflict, competition, comes with English and Spanish, as it is in the linguistic practice of these languages that political, economic, class and symbolic struggles are played out. Interaction between the three languages is of utmost importance. Are we talking about a challenge here or a problem?

It is anyone's guess, but the latter is always present.

I have immersed myself in the field of languages focusing on immigration on four occasions:

1. 10 years ago I used a nesting dolls analogy: in our territory there is a State, a national minority wanting to become a State, a significant number of immigrants from the State as well as immigrants from outside the State. These situations are difficult because individuals' rights must be stipulated and placed in a hierarchy. First and foremost, for example, a neurotic alliance develops between state and the minority group, in which one party's aspirations are the other party's nightmare, and vice versa. When one of the two takes a step forwards, the other gets nervous/frightened, because it knows what the other party wants to do, as it would do the same thing in the same situation. And vice versa. For example, when there is a desire to introduce a new education law, then the neurotic tendencies intensify. In light of the substitution process in Catalonia mentioned recently by Oriol, I wouldn't know what to say in the case of Basque.

2. On the second occasion, Erramun Osa, who was at the Language Policy department of the Basque Government at the moment, asked me the following: does immigration bring the Basque language new problems? No, not new problems! But it does intensify old ones! For a start, another downturn in the number of people who know the language and the need to explain the whys and wherefores of Basque. Before explaining the ins and outs of the language, we first have to explain why we should even bother with it, and that is tiresome <sup>1</sup>.

3. About 3 1/2 years ago I had to talk about Basque in cities and I said that cities were the enemies of Basque, but at the same time, from a territorial point of view, I pointed out that there existed some strategic escape routes and breathing spaces <sup>2</sup>.

4. Lastly, for a year and a half now I've been involved in the conferences organised by Topagunea.

How should we view this new multilingual reality? Worriedly, of course! As a member of a National minority, worry is your natural state and way of

being <sup>3</sup>. However, as all of this is my own personal attitude, I make my observations with great peace of mind. I am anthropologically optimistic!

As is only right, I shall start my study from the point of view of a sociologist, given that, leaving aside my own wishes, some social objects are possible in a society and some others are not. I am very much a fan of Bourdieu, who described social space as a field riddled with internal material and symbolic struggles and ever-restructuring social statuses.

Therefore, examining this question seriously, bearing in mind the relation of forces and the historical context, the survival of Basque to our times is a miracle. It has always been more likely to disappear than survive. Below it, geographically speaking, is a world language, the second most spoken language in the world. Above it, is the language of culture, elegance, the court, prestige and renown, French. How has Basque made it to our day? That is the real question and a starting point that inspires hope.

Bearing this mystery in mind, our present and our future look complicated and, what is more, there is no model to follow. There is no body of criteria that will help us. Moreover, if we look to political philosophy, neither common liberalism nor communitarianism will serve us. The branch of Liberalism II may help us to some extent.

Liberalism, whether we are talking about pluralism or the economy, is always the grammatical code of the winner: “be whatever you want at home, Jewish for example, but German outside the home”. Communitarianism offers very little help; the mere existence of a community – the Basques, for example – can free us from examining the complications. So, a revised analysis of liberalism, one that simply states that when a State promotes different cultures, that State is not neutral, gives us a way forward. Although it does at least recognise the complexity of the situation, we should not raise our hopes too high with theoretical travel companion. We have no model to follow, nor any theory to guide us.

Moreover, we have just seen and heard the Catalonians’ presentation. Well, to put it bluntly and without a shadow of doubt, only a few good practices/examples are worth bringing home from Catalonia, but they cannot serve as a model for us. Apart from forming part of the same State, we have nothing else in common. We should forget about the existence of Catalonia. Just as humanity finds it receives no answer upon asking the Universe, we Basques




are in the same situation: “is there anybody out there in the whole universe who will help us?” The answer is silence. We must invent a model: us, ourselves, here, ours, our own. Why?

Some data:

1. Knowledge of Basque decreases as towns or cities grow (chart1).


**Chart 1.** Knowledge of Basque in relation to population size (%), 2011



2. Where is Basque and where are the Basques? In the capital cities and in a number of breathing spaces. For example, the area comprising Deba, Urola Kosta and Donostia. More specifically, where are the Basques and how they distributed? Are they grouped or dispersed? And in those areas, of all the inhabitants, how many of them are Basque speakers? We must search for an ecological meeting point where immigration and Basque will be mutually beneficial. Why? By looking at maps we can see that there is no significant body of immigration in those areas where Basque is guaranteed, and vice versa <sup>4</sup>. That does not negate the existence of some breathing spaces, be it for Basque itself or for the tandem of Basque and immigration.

Olatz Altuna <sup>5</sup> pointed out the existence of these breathing spaces using a different set of charts (chart 2 and table 1).

**Chart 2:** Knowledge of Basque and the number of Basque speakers as a percentage of the total population of Basque speakers in the Basque Autonomous Community by area, 2011, BAC (%).




3. Urola Kosta, Tolosaldea, Goierri, Tolosaldea: a kind of nucleus is formed here and experiments should be carried out in this area.

**Table 1** Density index of Basque speakers (%), 2011


	Indizea
1 Donostialdea	17,2
2 Bilbo Handia	13,8
3 Urola Kosta	11,5
4 Debagoienea	6,8
5 Goierri	6,6
6 Gernika-Bermeo	6,6
7 Tolosaldea	6,5
8 Durangaldea	6,4
9 Debabarrena	5,1
10 Markina-Ondarroa	4,8
11 Arabako Lautada	3,7
12 Plentzia-Mungia	3,6
13 Bidasoa Beherea	3,5
14 Arratia-Nerbioi	1,9
15 Kantauri Arabarra	0,8
16 Enkartzioak	0,5
17 Gorbeia Inguruak	0,4
18 Arabako Errioxa	0,1
19 Arabako Ibarrak	0,0
20 Arabako Mendialdea	0,0

4. In the different social structures and social classes, Basque speakers have the most open-minded attitude towards immigration, and when prioritising either the Basque language and culture or human rights, they come down in favour of the latter without a doubt. However, the time has come for us concentrate on the former, and in the coming years Basque language and culture must be the focus of our efforts.

**Map 1. Geographical distribution of immigration**



**Map 2. Geographical distribution of Basque**




5. In order to study these different attitudes, let us look at some data taken from Ikuspegi Behatoki (tables in the appendix):

- a. When asked whether Basque would be lost with the arrival of immigration, 6 out of 10 people believe it would not and 2 out of 10 believed it would.
- b. When asked whether nationalist objectives would be hindered, again 6 said no and 2 said yes.
- c. When asked whether the development of Basque would lose momentum with the arrival of immigration, 7 out of 10 said no and 2 people said yes.
- d. In the same line, when asked whether the use of Basque would diminish amongst couples whose dominant language is Basque, the results were similar.

6. All these answers show that the most tolerant people are Gipuzkoan, Basque speakers, the most nationalist, the ones who feel more Basque, the ones who consider themselves to be progressive and others from similar



**Chart 4:** The social geography and social classes of Basque in the context of economic and cultural capital



b. An educated, urban, Spanish speaking class, that is strategically important and hope inspiring (the educated urban class). The members of this educated and professional sector have chosen Basque education for their children and although they do not have the same capital as the previous class, they are not far behind, at least culturally, and economically speaking too, they are close to the top. The sector has experienced great upward mobility. Over time, if they maintain strong status, they will become the upper middle class. They may play a role as a “cultural pseudo-aristocracy”. Perhaps not themselves, but their children will. This sector may be a good travel companion for the Basque language, but the journey is long and slow as it is transmitted onto the children. In order for the children to become fully competent speakers, it is important to get through to the parents with well thought-out and carefully targeted campaigns.

c. Then there is the Basque speaking group, made up of upper, middle and lower classes. The upper class accounts for a small portion, the middle class abounds and there is a small lower class. They are all well integrated into the fabric of society, have a high intellect and are economically sound, and these characteristics are accentuated in Gipuzkoa, where the highest percentages of Basque speakers are found. In general, Basque speakers do not have any problems with infrastructure and, in principle, they have enough social resources to revitalise the language. In this sector, the large subsector that is found at all levels of education and education is of great strategic importance. It is these people, along with a number of creative individuals, who will revive and modernise the Basque language and its linguistic domains. In terms of attitudes and values, this sector is very modern.

d. Next, most members of the lower class have come into contact with Basque through the education system. This subsector has no social power and does not serve as a reference, but from the point of view of corpus, they are essential for the language, because growth in the number of speakers will come from this group. They inevitably need Basque, as it is thanks only to the language that they can achieve any upward mobility. And as Basque inevitably needs them, we must convince them to feel confident in the language.

e. Lastly, there is immigration from abroad. The largest contingents of immigration are found in cities and there are usually two challenges concerning this population:

1. Above all, they generally choose education in Spanish in centres that have not undergone any kind of education reform. So, there is work to be done here on the part of institutions and the government etc.

2. Immigration intensifies some of the problems facing Basque, but it does not generate new ones<sup>6</sup>. The relationship between immigration and Basque requires a comprehensive programme so as to meet two objectives in a single stroke: social and linguistic inclusion at same time. With the reception process over, and having set up logical hierarchies within the multilingual context, the time has come to take this comprehensive intervention further forward.

In the following section, we set out the affinity that each sector has for the Basque language. The truth is that no specific study has been carried out on this subject, so this characterisation is based on educated guesses. In any case, if it serves for other topics (identity, ideology, the kind of State desired and such like), then it also serves as a starting point for Basque.

As such, I feel that, for the purposes of discourse management in relation to Basque, how the language is offered should depend on each sector, requiring differentiated programmes, which would require heavy financial investment, extensive investigation and targeted publicity campaigns.

**Chart 4.** Basque affinity by sector, class and capital

Sector	Capital			Affinity for Basque
	Economic	Cultural	Social	
Upper class	Large	Large	Very large	Very Little / Next to none
Educated urban class	Ample	Large	Large	Half and half
Basque speakers	Ample	Large	Large	Complete
Lower class	Limited	Limited	Limited	Nearly complete
Immigrants	Very limited	Very limited	Limited	Little

*Source: author*

This situation is yet to be examined scientifically and it would be useful to know what sort of discourse is generated and sustained in relation to the Basque language in these sectors, classes and subclasses. All of these postures are reflected in the chart.

Basque is situated at a complex crossover point where social classes and ethnopolitical postures meet. The journalist Nerea Azurmendi would often say with great wit that she did not know whether we were at a crossroads or a roundabout with Basque. She would always choose the latter.

Looking towards the future:

1. There will be no problem with other languages. Immigrants will be incorporated into the Spanish speaking community and to a much lesser extent into the Basque speaking community. For example, in the United States, 37% of the third generation have maintained Spanish (Portes).
2. However, demands that may be made by any linguistic community must be met and encouraged. However, it is not credible to establish artificial multilingualism, as there is no need for us to be the champions of pluralism. In all of this the *right to indifference* is also very important<sup>7</sup>.
3. The educated sectors whose dominant language is Spanish have attitudes and opinions that view Basque as an obstacle. In any case, the future is in the hands of their children because, in general, the educated sectors are not significant in numbers. Lastly, strategy and social campaigns should be adapted to each sector.

Where might the future lie?


1. Along paths that Basque makes for its own development. Moreover, if it solves its own problems, it will solve those of the other languages and at the same time the problems of language concurrence.
2. The principle of equality must be guaranteed in society and we must strive to deal with all demands in the area of culture democratically, whilst favouring Basque.
3. The preference for Spanish or English will come about socially: “society-social facts” (Durkheim).
4. Above all, getting it right with Basque will mean getting it right with the other languages.



## Appendices


### Appendix A. Opinions in Basque society regarding Basque language, identity and culture.

Will the arrival of immigrants from abroad contribute to the loss of Basque identity?




*The arrival of immigrants from abroad will contribute to the loss of a Basque identity(G22c)*

Will the arrival of immigrants from abroad hinder Basque nationalist objectives?



*The arrival of immigrants from abroad will hinder Basque nationalist objectives (G22c)*

Will the arrival of immigrants from abroad slow down the growth of Basque?




Will the arrival of immigrants from abroad limit the use of Basque in those areas of the Basque Autonomous Community where Basque is dominant?




*The arrival of immigrants from abroad will cause Basque to be used less in those places where the language is currently used by most of the population (G22b)*

## Is it good or bad that foreigners “have their own education centres”?



*It is better for Basque society, that all, natives and immigrants, speak the languages of the receiving society.  
(From 2004 to 2011): It is better for Basque society, that all, immigrants and natives, speak the same language (G18c)*

## Is it good or bad that foreigners “speak to each other in their own language”?



*Do you think it is good or bad that foreigners have their own education centres?*

## Appendix B. Immigrants' views on the Basque language.

### “Basque? Its socially irrelevant!”

- “I don’t think it’s an important language. That’s my opinion. I don’t think it’s spoken by even 0.01% of the world’s population, so I’ve never been interested in learning it.” (LO)
- “I’ve thought about it, but the people in Vitoria aren’t much help because they don’t speak Basque. They don’t value their own language properly.” (LO)
- “Language is important for integration, but not Basque. Spanish, to communicate with others.” (AO)
- “Here you don’t need it, but if you go off into some towns, you can hardly live. If you get a waiter who doesn’t feel like speaking Spanish, you ask for a coffee and he answers you in Basque.” (RA)

- “The thing is, it’s only useful locally. Teach them more English. Make it the second language. It would be more useful to have that on my curriculum than Basque.” (LA)
- “I don’t think Basque is so indispensable to work in a company.” (RA)
- “Language shouldn’t be imposed, it should be optional.” (LO)
- “I’m in Spain and I want [my children] to learn Spanish, not only Basque.” (MA)
- “I’m against teaching children only Basque because if I leave here I want my daughter to know how to express herself in Spanish. I live in Spain and don’t like it if there’re only taught Basque.” (MA)
- “I think they should concentrate more on English. It’s really important. If you go to China, you speak to them in English, not Basque.” (MO)
- “Basque is the language from here. It’s useless to you if you travel and you never know...” (LA)

### **“Basque? It’s an obstacle!”**

- “It’s a obstacle. For me it’s a work barrier because I can’t do the things I could do because I don’t know Basque.” (LA)
- “For us it’s a hindrance. Until now I haven’t had many problems, but it’s getting worse and worse. We can’t employ you because I have to take on someone who knows Basque. It’s the same in other jobs, in shops.” (LA)
- “If you’ve got the right skills, even if you’re more skilled than another person, they can’t get rid of someone from a job if they know Basque. And also, you just don’t use it because hardly anyone comes to the shop speaking Basque.” (LA)
- “They set up barriers in some jobs that stop you from taking up a post if you don’t know Basque. You can do cleaning jobs or be a waitress, but when you get to a certain level...” (LA)
- “They’ll ask a young person to have Basque. You see it in job adverts. You have a look at the ads in Lanbide and you’ll see how important it is to know Basque. Of course, at our age you’re not going to start learning Basque.” (LO)
- “The best jobs, as far as anyone knows, are civil servant jobs and if it helps you in the future like English helps you to travel around the world, then I think it’s good they learn Basque.” (LO).

## Notes

1. *See in the second appendix what some members of recent immigration feel about the social relevance of Basque and how they view it is an obstacle that acts as a barrier to upward mobility.*
2. *Data on the spatial distribution of Basque – charts, tables and maps later.*
3. *Just compare Sarkozy creating the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity or Huntington asking “What are we?” when at least he could see that Spanish would substitute English in the United States.  
We do at least have a minimum right to complain. Let it be granted to me.*
4. *The maps show that at present Basque and immigration are spatially segregated.*
5. *Euskararen bilakaera soziolinguistikoa (1981-2011), VIII Euskal Soziolinguistika Jardunaldietan, Donostia, 2016ko ekainaren 3an*
6. *Erramun Osa eta Xabier Aierdi, “Immigrazio berria, hizkuntza arazo berririk?”, Euskera, 54 lbkia., 3, zenbakia, Bilbao, 2009, 1433-1452 orrialdeak.*
7. *Manuel Delgado, Sociedades movedizas. Pasos hacia una antropología de las calles, Anagrama, Barcelona, 2007.*



# 8- LANGUAGE AND MIGRATORY POLICIES IN CATALONIA

**Oriol Amorós i March**  
**Muntsa Garro i Costa**

**Abstract:** *This article presents the linguistic situation in Catalonia in the context of a demographic transformation of such scale that it may be asked whether a process of linguistic substitution of Catalan is taking place. This hypothesis is analysed and ruled out while the main instruments that have structured the Catalanian policy of integration are presented: the National Pact for Immigration and the Reception Law.*

## **Introduction**

Catalonia has been living one of the greatest demographic transformations in Europe and one of the most intense population growths attributable to immigration in the world. Throughout the last 15 years, a million and a half persons have chosen Catalonia as their immigrant destination, almost none of them speaking Catalan as a first language. The situation poses a serious disadvantage for these persons and redounds to less job and other types of opportunities. The numbers are also of such magnitude as to plausibly

inquire whether we are in a process of linguistic substitution and how this may be confronted. Both needs – offering equal opportunities and ensuring the survival of Catalan – are the driving forces behind the linguistic policy adopted with respect to immigration.


### **The Current Situation in Catalonia**

The high rate of immigration over the past 15 years has resulted in 37% of today's Catalan population being born outside Catalonia, at least one-third of the children having one foreign parent, and one-fourth of new marriages in which at least one of the parties is a foreigner.

The 2013 Survey of Language Use indicates that, among those born abroad – which largely occurs in the younger age brackets – 62.1% use Spanish as their habitual language and 23.7% habitually use languages other than Catalan and Spanish. To be underscored among these other languages are Arabic (151,700); Romanian (56,100), Amazigh (41,800), French (38,800), Galego (33,200) and Russian (31,900). All these data imply a drastic decrease in the use of Catalan due to an increase in the non-Catalan speaking population.

Even so, the population knowing how to speak Catalan has increased by more than 9 percentage points and the number of persons knowing how to write it has almost doubled since 1986. The 2013 data indicate that 36.4% of the total population consider Catalan as their language of identity (considering it their language), more than 5 points above those who consider it their first language or initial language (31%).

One preliminary conclusion could be that the weight of the Catalan social base is regulated by two opposing forces: while demography reduces it in percentage terms, social prestige and the willingness to learn increase it.



Graph 1. Source: *Enquesta d'Usos Lingüístics de la Població, 2013*

### Is Catalan undergoing a process of substitution?

In the light of data on a decreased use of Catalan given the magnitude of demographic changes, it could be asked whether or not we are witnessing a process of linguistic substitution. According to socio-linguists, a substitution process basically undergoes three phases: bilingualisation, the loss in spheres of use and the interruption of language transmission from one generation to another (De Rosselló, 2015).

Let us next analyse this hypothesis based on the analysis of each of the phases mentioned.

### Does an asymmetrical bilingualisation exist?

Bilingualisation does not affect the entire population in processes of substitution; rather, it only affects those individuals belonging to a community politically considered a minority. In this phase, therefore, there is asymmetrical bilingualism: some people speak languages X and Y while others only speak Y.

In the case of the Principality of Catalonia, Spanish is the language that almost 100% of the population know, whereas Catalan is understood orally (the most widespread basic capacity) by 94% of the population.



However, asymmetrical bilingualism disappears progressively in the population younger than 40, giving way to a more symmetrical bilingualism the younger the generation analysed. This may be attributed to the role that Catalan plays in school and the stake set in place in its day by linguistic immersion as a method for learning Catalan.

### **Does a loss in spheres of use exist?**

In the second phase of substitution, the recessive language disappears from many social spheres. Speakers only communicate in the dominant language (Y), whether because it is the only code shared by all the members of society or because the image of X is highly deteriorated.

Native Catalan speakers do not hide their language in school, at work, in bars, etc., nor is Catalan only used by those who have spoken it at home since childhood. Indeed, a significant percentage of those habitually using Catalan come from linguistically non-Catalan origins.


Were we to ask whether Catalan has lost in spheres of use during the last few years, the answer in general terms would have to be no, although there may be spheres, such as courts of justice, where it is not present – nor has it been in previous studies.

### **Is there an interruption in transmission from parents to children?**

The third phase of a substitution process is conclusive: when parents decide not to further transmit the language to their children and to substitute it with a new code.

Based on the concrete data from the Enquesta d'Usos Lingüístics de la Població, we can conclude that the process of inter-generational linguistic transmission is favourable to Catalan.

Language use with grandparents, parents and the eldest offspring indicate a process of inter-generational transmission favourable to Catalan, since the use of Catalan with the eldest offspring (37.3%) is greater than with fathers (30.7%) or mothers (31.1%), and even exceeds its use with maternal or paternal grandparents (29.5% and 28.8%, respectively).



Graph 2. Source: *Enquesta D'Usos Lingüístics de la Població, 2013*


### Is there interest in learning Catalan?

From analysis of both general use and inter-generational use, we then see that many Catalan speakers are so because they learnt it outside the family setting.

In the EU-27 ranking of languages learnt, Catalan occupies a far from negligible seventh position: 0.74% of European nationals speak Catalan because they have learnt it, despite the fact that it is not their first language; 0.97% among younger Europeans. Catalan is the only language without a State backing it that is in this position.

If we relate these data to the demographic dimension of each language, we will have Catalan ranking after English as the European language with the highest percentage of speakers for whom it is not a first language.

Catalan grows because it is learnt, not because of its population base.



*Graph 3. Source: Eurobarometer, 2012*

With this perspective, and in the light shed by the data presented, we may conclude that there is no linguistic substitution despite the loss in spheres of use, since there is a greater percentage of the population that can choose between two or more languages (symmetrical bilingualism) and parent-to-children language transmission increases.

### **Instruments to Promote Catalan in the Sphere of Migratory Policies**

One of the fundamental features of the policies relating to immigration in Catalonia has been the willingness to reach political and social consensus.

From the 1992 Girona Report, with fifty proposals on immigration, to the current Refugee Reception Committee, there has been an intention, not always successful, to remove the subject of immigration from the agendas of short-term debate and situate it in the framework of the consensus on long-term transformation.

This intention to reach consensus found its most expressive form in the National Pact for Immigration and in Law 10/2010 on the Reception of Immigrants and Persons Returning to Catalonia.

### **The National Pact for Immigration**

This was signed in 2008 by the institutional, political, economic and social representatives of Catalonia and spelled out, first of all, an explanation to the citizenry on the profound demographic transformation experienced and its structural and irreversible nature. It defines full citizenship as the horizon for the policies relating to immigration, the need to synchronise real immigration and legality, express it on the labour market, adapt public services to a society of diversity and build a model of coexistence based on the balance between integration and diversity, the right to one's own identity and the right to a public culture to be shared by all the members of a society.

In this sense, the National Pact for Immigration defined the common public culture as the shared space of communication, coexistence, recognition and participation for our diverse and differentiated society, so that the Catalanian nation could continue to be the reference point for the entire population living and working in it – a space structured around the principle of acknowledging diversity and the principle of social redistribution.

The Pact establishes the need to value and promote the more than 300 languages spoken today in Catalonia, as well as to promote the use of one language mediating in the communication between all the members of society – Catalan, as a tool for social cohesion and for access to equal opportunities.

In other words, Catalonia will never ask anybody to stop being who he is, but rather all the contrary, while at the same time it will invite all those living together to share the Catalanian language and culture.

### **Reception Law and the First Reception Service**

The Reception Law, in turn, creates the first reception service for the purpose of promoting the personal autonomy of immigrants who are at a disadvantage due to their ignorance of the receiving society, the principal legal precepts that govern it, and its labour market, or due to their lack of basic language skills. How? Based on a training programme on all those

subjects promoting equality in opportunities, universally accessible and free of charge.


**Migratory policy activities promoting the language**

This section reflects some activities without purporting to be exhaustive:

S1A, the First Reception Service

The First Reception Service (S1A) is designed as a training project for adults to increase their personal autonomy and also includes individualised care, training, and information activities revolving around three blocks of knowledge: Catalanian society and its legal framework, job skills, and linguistic training. This last training item consists of a minimum training period of 90 hours, through which the user is expected to acquire basic skills in Catalan.

**Outline of the First Reception Service**



*Graph 4. Source: Prepared by the authors*

## **Literacy in Catalan**

One need also addressed by the S1A is literacy. Illiteracy, which affects both natives and recent arrivals, particularly women, has increased during the last few years<sup>1</sup> and should be eradicated from any society wishing to call itself a “society of knowledge”. It is therefore an objective of the S1A to improve the training of users, particularly those from families with children enrolled in the educational centres, in order to contribute as well to their academic success. The offer supplements that of adult schools and similar initiatives implemented by entities and some municipalities.

Noteworthy in this second group of initiatives is the programme, “Lletres per a tothom”, to promote literacy in Catalan for adults of foreign origin.

## **Education and Immigration**

The activities in this area will be oriented along two differentiated thrusts. On the one hand, activities intended to promote good practices or successful educational practices being conducted in Catalan schools.

There are several examples to underscore, ranging from academic reinforcement activities for pupils, parent training, programmes to introduce volunteer work in the classrooms, the creation of learning communities, the training of youth who enlist in the Youth Guarantee Plan to become youth monitors, or a programme called “Xarxa de Famílies” soon to be introduced, designed along the same lines as the consolidated Canadian Youth Empowering Parents (YEP).

On the other hand are the activities seeking to bring educational institutions closer to the reality of their students, turning schools into spaces that reflect them while ideally oriented to being schools for all.

The government intention is to give more importance to the curriculum of diversity: training teachers in cross-cultural and gender issues, promoting knowledge of the religions observed in our population – Islam among them, introducing new sports practised in the immigrant population countries of origin, or teaching the immigrants’ languages to enable the youth not to lose their connection with their parents’ cultures.

## **Courses in Catalan for Adults**

Imparted by the Consorci per a la Normalització Lingüística, these courses facilitate training in Catalan to enable autonomy for immigrants in the receiving society, reduce the risk of exclusion, promote job placement, and integrate immigrants into the standard circuits of public services.

## **Conclusions**

Managing immigration grounded in the acknowledgement of basic rights, with the final objective of full citizenship based on the same public services for everybody, in political and social consensus and backed by a proposal for coexistence balanced between diversity and integration, is a complex but not impossible task that governments of varying political colours have undertaken in Catalonia.

The arrival of a million and a half immigrants has had a clear impact on the social use of the Catalan language, increasing asymmetrical bilingualism at the outset. However, analysing the hypothesis as to whether this immigration could entail a process of linguistic substitution, the authors consider that, there being an increase in the symmetry of bilingualism in the younger generations – new spheres of social use not having been lost and a generational transmission favourable to Catalan having been observed – this may be ruled out.

Despite what is affirmed, a loss of substance in social use is observed that, if not compensated, could bring about a situation of pronounced inequality for immigrants not competent in Catalan, a loss of social cohesion and, ultimately, a risk to the future of Catalan and, therefore, to cultural diversity in the world.

Combating these risks calls for an active policy of spreading the knowledge and use of Catalan as a language, as well as recognising and appreciating the linguistic and cultural diversity of Catalan society.

Activities combining language and immigration should be diverse, implemented in those venues where Catalan has less of a presence, offering resources of all sorts to make language learning easier and more flexible, while always relying on a shared institutional framework of consensus – such as the National Pact for Immigration and the Reception Law – and striking a balance between diversity and integration.

Thus, recognition and appreciation of diversity should be expressed in concrete measures such as, for instance, learning the languages of immigrants in public schools, recognising the knowledge of these languages in workplaces, supporting different cultural expressions and, in another order of things, respecting the exercise of religious freedom.

Striking this balance would certainly be a great contribution to a surprising world surprised by the experience of diversity.

## Notes

1. *Population aged 16 and above with no studies or not knowing how to read or write over total population: 10.0%; male: 8.1%; female: 11.8. Source: Idescat, based on the 2011 INE Census.*

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## 9- BANAIZ BAGARA ASSOCIATION: “EUSKARA PLUS” PROJECT

**Another way to enable migrants to become part of the Basque-speaking community.**

**Petra Elser**

**Abstract:** *Banaiz Bagara association aims to make the Basque language accessible to the immigrant community. During its 6 years itinerary, two years ago was a turning point: moving from social coexistence based on leisure and in general to a work-based offer – the Euskara Plus plan. The article analyses why this turning point occurred, which are the experiences that resulted from the new project and which strategic challenges lie ahead in the future.*

## **1. The trajectory & experience of the Banaiz Bagara association**

The Banaiz Bagara association was founded in Urnieta in 2009 to bring together immigrants and the world of Basque, with the aim of helping immigrants to foster a relationship with the Basque language and providing them the opportunity to live in Basque and especially live alongside Basque-speakers.

We have provided free and open basic Basque language classes for over 5 years in 12 localities in Gipuzkoa, and, in parallel, created shared experiences with inhabitants to build relationships with Basque-speakers.

In the previous format, groups were based on communication with those who wanted to avoid academic courses, bringing the language to them (eg. Tolosa, Azkoitia, women's group). Additionally, we created certain leisure activities. As there is a large Pakistani community living in Azkoitia, we offered cricket for all inhabitants in Basque. Choirs and immigrants are brought together with singing, meals and other events. There are also other outings to take part in Basque-language events and activities (eg. Nafarroa Oinez), to get to know Basque culture and Basque-speakers.

We managed to get a large number of people to take part. There was a wide variety of people: foreign immigrants and Spanish, older generations (those who are today around 60 years old, those who came from Spain at certain periods and had never learnt Basque). We managed to reach out to a wide community.

## **2. Reflection & consequences: how the project changed**

However, we identified two factors.

- 1) It was very difficult to get local Basque-speakers to take part in the groups and create lasting relationships. Many people came from time to time, and were at ease, but lasting relationships were not created. Diversity festivals were successful, but only take place once a year and in the meanwhile everyone lives in their own separate community.
- 2) The motivation of participants dropped significantly when they found work or a vocational course (NB. for immigrants accessible jobs and courses are usually in Spanish, and that they cannot access either jobs or vocational training courses where Basque is a requirement).

There was a collision with “serious” jobs and “real life”, leaving the Basque language in second place.

In order to create opportunities for immigrants in areas where Basque is required or encouraged, we changed to a new format based on a European project.

### **3. New project: Euskara Plus, based on the European “Language for Work” network**

We found out about the European Language for Work network (part of an organisation set up by the Council of Europe, ECML). This innovative learning process is cultivated in connection with language (“Learning through languages”).

As part of Language for Work, the experiences of several regions were collected.

They mostly provide skill-based learning processes. With regard to migrants, learning processes bring together vocational skills and language. We heard about a specific experience in Sweden (ArbetSam project).

The Swedish government spent millions to enable migrants working in the care sector to take Swedish language classes during working hours.

Several hundred people took part in the programme, but after attending these language classes, they received negative feedback. The migrants felt lost in these classes.

Consequently, pilot projects were created in certain old people’s homes to enable these people to learn work-related language and these projects were much more successful. The same is true of these people’s perception of success.

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of success. Several European regions take part in the ECML and “Language for Work” network.

Lesser-used languages were, by nature, not present, but in the European network many areas and regions have such needs: Corsica, Luxembourg, Malta, Finland, Sweden, etc. There is a need, which so far has not been satisfied.

This was the starting point for our project.

#### **4. Experience from the “Language for Work” projects applied to Basque**

In our five years of experience, since the world of work and employment are major factors in the motivation of immigrants, we created work-related courses. In 2015 we overhauled our offer and set up a new work-related project, called Euskara Plus.

We provide Basque courses with a vocational aim.

We offer Basque as a work skill.

It is mostly aimed at people with work-related difficulties to provide basic or intermediate level qualifications for work.

We endeavour to provide support throughout the entire process. It is not only a course, but also the chance to foster understanding and create awareness of the role played by Basque in the job market for people leaving the course and entering the world of work.

Although they have some knowledge of Basque, the local work situation in almost all areas is bilingual. To fully understand this, preparation is required.

At present, we provide Euskara Plus courses in three areas: industry, hotel & catering trade and care.

We always use authentic work tools and venues.

## **5. The importance of cooperation & transversality**

Transversality is of major importance, i.e. cooperation in different fields. The process of integration into the workplace cannot only be carried out perspectives: language, employment services, training institutions, the local community, etc.

Through the Euskara Plus project, we cooperate with organisations that work in these fields and propose new projects for joint implementation from an innovative perspective.

We believe not only in training and integrating immigrants in the world of work and, more generally, but also in working together with other fields.

Qualifications and finding one's place in the job market are major factors in the integration process and therefore in social cohesion. Equal opportunities in different languages are an essential part of all qualifications.

## **6. A path for training immigrants and the current situation**

It is important to create paths.

Nowadays, the reality of welcoming immigrants is as follows:

MAIN OFFER (the usual path of immigrants before arriving on the job market):

HHI (Adult Continuous Training), and then, Spanish courses in Lanbide.

In parallel, there are other offers: Basque language schools for adults, Auzoko, Banaiz Bagara and other individual projects, but these are not part of the main path.

## PATHS I (today)

Offer for new arrivals:  
Language: Spanish  
Cost: Free for participants

- HHI (Adult Continuous Training)
- Learn Spanish / Basque (few hours, no work method)
- “School certificate”, “Vocational certificate”
- Profession: Courses, regulated / unregulated

Offer for new arrivals:  
Language: Basque  
Cost: €0 - €450

- AISA courses (Basque culture, 60 hours, min. number of participants)
- Special programmes, contracted services (reception plans, Auzoko, Banaiz Bagara, ...)
- Basque language courses for adults (academic year, from level 0 upwards) Euskara Plus (unregulated, 20 hours)

*Fig. 1 -Current offer for newcomers.*

For the future we want to create a path, where people who follow Basque language and other vocational courses are given vocational skills and are integrated into the workplace in both languages.


## PATH II (aims)

- HHI (Adult Continuous Training): Integrated Basque methodologically applied in a viable manner
- “School certificate”, “Vocational certificate”: Basque as a subject, with a communication and professional objective
- “Vocational training”: Projects to work with two languages, opportunity to study Basque alongside a trade.

*Fig. 2. - Ideal future offer for newcomers*

## 7. Work streams in short

Finally, Fig. 3 shows the work streams that our organization proposes.



*Fig. 3 – Work streams in short.*





# 10. The venture undertaken by a school in Vitoria-Gasteiz: the Ramon Bajo school in the City's Old Quarter

**Leire Diaz de Gereñu**

**Abstract:** *This paper reports on the evolution that has taken place at the Ramon Bajo School. This exclusively Spanish-medium school filled up with migrant students in the 1990s and turned into a ghetto. It has introduced the Basque-medium education model and the number of local students has gradually matched the number of migrant ones; and the school is no longer a ghetto. Driven by local initiative, Basquisition and the inclusion of migrants have become the aims of this school. The history of this evolution and the protagonists are described below.*

## **Introduction**

We believe that schooling in the Basque-medium education models offers not only the autochthonous students, but also the children of immigrants who have come to the Basque Country the chance to attend a quality

school. However, that does not generally happen in Vitoria-Gasteiz: the majority of immigrants study in the Spanish-medium education models.

We can speak of the segregation of migrant students and many protagonists are involved. Apart from the opportunities for inclusion being lost, can this situation promote the revival of Basque?

Linguistic rights and civil rights appear to be in collision with each other (Barquin 2008) in non-Basque-speaking cities like Vitoria-Gasteiz.

Because of the poor situation of Basque in Vitoria-Gasteiz<sup>1</sup>, Basque-speaking parents in particular but also many of those who are keen for their children to become Basque speakers specifically seek out networks of relations in Basque (Gasteizko udala-Kultur Ka2a 2014). An indication of what we are saying is the setting up of the natural D (Basque-medium) model at one time in Vitoria-Gasteiz. Only students from Basque-speaking homes were admitted into these classrooms. Today, these models continue in some schools, but even if it does not happen in such a structured way, the students from Basque-speaking homes are becoming concentrated in certain schools. In this situation, the interaction between the Basque-speaking community and the immigrants is becoming more difficult. We are aware that it is very important for a student who is not from a Basque-speaking home to develop interaction as that way an attitude in favour of the minority language can be fostered.

The immigrants who are present in large numbers in the A (Spanish-medium) education models achieve very low levels of knowledge pertaining to the Basque language and Basque culture, and what is more, they are often in interaction with students who harbour an attitude against Basque (Garaio 2014).

So the situation is worrying not only in terms of social equality but also in terms of promoting attitudes in favour of Basque among immigrants.

Firstly, we will be providing below a brief contextualisation of the issue we are dealing with. Secondly, we will be providing a brief history of the

Ramon Bajo School to explain how Basquisition and inclusion emerged also be referring to future challenges.

### **A brief contextualisation**

Since 1982, three education models have been offered in the education system in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) and parents choose the one out of the three that they consider the most suited to their children: model A (Spanish is the medium of instruction); model B (both Basque and Spanish are the medium of instruction, half and half); and model D (Basque is the medium of instruction). The Ramon Bajo School, which is the subject of this paper, began to switch from education model A (the education model in which Spanish is the medium of instruction) to model D in 2002 at the request of two Basque-speaking parents and with the approval of the teachers.

What happened is not that surprising in the BAC's education system.

Indeed, since the 1980s, education model D has prevailed at the request of parents in the public and direct-grant school networks. Model D has also become widespread in Spanish-speaking areas and so most of the children who do not have Basque as their first language at home study in Basque at school without coming from Basque-speaking homes. Despite the fact that model D was anticipated for children from Basque-speaking homes (Idiazabal 2003), the fact that the majority of parents who speak Spanish at home opted for this model for their children has been a decisive factor in the process to normalise the Basque language.

In Vitoria-Gasteiz Basque has a low presence in the street, approximately 4% (Martinez de Luna 2007). Even though the number of Basque speakers is higher (22.5% fully Basque-speaking and 26.1%<sup>2</sup> nearly Basque-speaking) networks of relations are mostly Spanish-speaking ones. As pointed out, despite the actual Basque use, most parents have been opting for the Basque-medium education model D for their offspring.

The children of migrants from outside Spain, however, remain outside this general trend. We feel that the situation needs to be analysed.

Since 2002, the number of immigrants has increased steadily and they now account for nearly 10% of the population. The majority of the children of immigrants are enrolled in education models B and A. In addition, there are 24 schools in Vitoria-Gasteiz that exceed the recommended percentage of migrant students and the ghettoization of students of migrant parents limits the chances of inclusion of these students (Ruiz de Arkaute 2015). It has to be pointed out that this ghettoization is also happening in schools offering education model D: 70% of students in some schools may be of immigrant origin and 10% in others. An additional consideration is that public schools take 80% of the students of immigrant origin.

At the end of the day, we believe that the criteria and procedures used to educate students of immigrant origin need to be explored, and whatever the outcome may be, an in-depth interpretation going beyond the data needs to be made.

### **A brief history of the Ramon Bajo School**

We said that the switch from education model A to model D was started progressively in 2002 at the Ramon Bajo School at the request of some parents. The models A and D in fact coexisted until the 2006/2007 academic year. For many years over 75% of the students at the school have been from migrant families. The families, on the whole, belong to a range of socio-economic-cultural levels and there has been great diversity in terms of language, too: Mandarin Chinese, Arabic, Hassaniya Arabic, Urdu, German, Guarani, Romani, Romanian, Basque, Spanish, etc.

It was not until the 2012/2013 academic year that model D was fully implemented in Primary. Since then the number of autochthonous students has been increasing. The students have come from Spanish-speaking homes as well as, to a lesser extent, from Basque-speaking homes. A piece of data indicative of the change: the 2016/2017 academic year will be the one that will have the most students from Basque-speaking homes in the classroom of 2-year-olds. Over the years the number of home languages of the students of other origins have also been increasing: Portuguese (Brazilian), Wolof, Serer, Mandinka-Sose, Pular, Amazigh, French, English, Italian, among others. In the end, the school has managed to represent the diversity of the old quarter even though 50% of the students are still immigrants when in fact the number of immigrants

in the neighbourhood is 20%. To facilitate the inclusion of students in their coming and going in the search for a better life it is very important for there to be a stable group of autochthonous students. While other factors that constitute serious social problems are being addressed, school ghettos made up of students of immigrant origin are very detrimental in particular for the students who come and go. Not only students but also teachers and parents need a stable student group that will welcome them appropriately.

In the school's experience immigrants have not in fact displayed any attitudes against Basque and in some cases they have specifically sought it out. Therefore, on that point we have not come across any attitudes against Basque as referred to in the Vitoria-Gasteiz City Council diagnosis (2014).

The problem is this: as the municipal diagnosis itself says, even if there are no attitudes against, migrants do not have sufficient information on the situation and social value of Basque. And the sociolinguistic situation of Basque in Vitoria-Gasteiz does not of course help them very much in this respect. So in our view, the work of the school's parents' association, teachers and, in particular, the management teams should be properly highlighted when migrants enrol in the Basque-medium education models. Since students in the BAC enrol at the school itself, the reception these families receive is hugely important.

Managing diversity at school is no easy task, and is even more difficult when the aim is to teach a minority language. There is a lack of resources and training. Yet the school has forged its own path in this work and could provide a model in this respect.

### **The school's achievements in language teaching.**

In addition to the above, there are some specific achievements that need to be highlighted in the teaching of language in particular. We have data showing that students of immigrant origin in the Basque-speaking area are managing to learn Basque within a few years (Manterola & Lardizabal 2009). The study by Diaz de Gereñu & Garcia-Azkoaga (2016) showed that the students at the Ramon Bajo school, too, and as long as they complete all their primary education there<sup>3</sup>, are learning to produce stories in both Basque and Spanish. They display difficulties similar to those for whom Basque is their second language, in particular with respect to modalization

but the stories analysed are correct and suitable in terms of text and grammar use. Even though official diagnoses (the ISEI/IVEI diagnosis) are widely used and turn out to be valid when it comes to confirming the success of the Basque-medium education models, it is important to obtain these data because they fail to take into account the diversity of situations in some schools today. What happens is that migrant students who have only spent a year at the school participate in these tests? Therefore, we do not think that it is either possible or fair to compare some data in the official diagnosis, unless some adjustments are made.

### **Protagonist in the evolution of the school**

Let us briefly consider the protagonists in the evolution of the school:

- Basque parents were the main protagonists at the beginning; they requested that the D model be implemented, and set up contacts and negotiation with the teachers. They set up the Basarte Parents' Association.
- The involvement of some parents of immigrant origin was very important, in particular in giving meaning to what would become a neighbourhood project for Basque-speaking parents.
- The fact that the school's teachers enrolled their children at the school.
- The fact that some teachers learnt Basque and also that Basque-speaking supply teachers displayed a clear, militant attitude in favour of Basque because they supported the project.
- The involvement of the neighbourhood in the new school project: a platform was set up to request new premises offering adequate conditions and space for the neighbourhood school, among other things.
- Offering leisure activities in Basque in the neighbourhood: the Basarte Parents' Association set up the GOIAN leisure group. The leisure activities are coordinated with the school.
- Other types of social initiative: for example, the implementing of the AUZOKO programme during the 2015-2016 academic year by the TOPAGUNEA federation of Basque-language associations succeeded in promoting knowledge about Basque and interaction between parents and inhabitants in the neighbourhood, which in turn influenced the school through the parents.

Our main aim was to seek elements of cohesion among parents, teachers and students from different cultural and language backgrounds with

and students from different cultural and language backgrounds with Basque positioned at the centre at all times.

The challenges linked to this are:

- To balance the numbers of autochthonous students and those of migrant origin (together with all the other schools in Vitoria-Gasteiz).
- To get Basque-speaking parents more involved: it has become clear that they are the main protagonists in the school.
- To promote the involvement and active attitude towards Basque of parents whose first language is Spanish at home, so that they have a clearer attitude towards Basque in school activities and in front of their children.
- To set up initiatives to encourage migrant parents to participate while Basque is put at the centre.
- Initiatives to explain the sociolinguistic situation of Basque and the implications of the fact that Basque is a minority language, with a view to taking the whole school community and language diversity into consideration.
- To obtain programmes to stabilise the teachers (Barquin & Ruiz Bikandi, 2009), and to have a teaching staff trained to address the diversity are even more important in schools like ours. Together with this, pedagogical partners are essential in the classrooms nowadays and so is specific training in managing diversity.
- Specific research into language didactics to find out what is being done and what is effective in these situations (Garcia Azkoaga & Idiazabal, 2015): the need to conduct research into how to manage diversity in the language-teaching classroom and to guarantee Basque.

## **Conclusions**

The involvement of all the protagonists comprising the school community is very important in the context we have explained, given that popular initiative is the main protagonist with the potential to change the history of Basque. We believe that we have additional difficulties in interacting with the newcomers bearing in mind that Basque is a minority language and in a non-Basque-speaking area like Vitoria-Gasteiz. The Basquisition of the children of 20th-century Spanish migrants did not happen on its own. Having overcome the prejudices and conflicts of the past, we have new ones right here knocking at the door.

They will not sort themselves out on their own, either, but we do have a roadmap and we believe that the revival of Basque will include getting to grips with this issue.

## Notes

1. *There will of course be other reasons: the desire to maintain social class, racism, etc., but working on them is not the aim of this work. What interests us in particular is the language conflict that has arisen when guaranteeing a minority language. So it is an issue with two sides: the desire to ensure the transmission of a minority language can turn into an excuse for marginalisation.*

2. 5th Sociolinguistic Survey. 2011: Basque Country, Basque Autonomous Community, Navarre, Continental Basque Country) [http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/contenidos/informacion/argitalpenak/eu\\_6092adjuntos/V.%2Inkesta.pdf](http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/contenidos/informacion/argitalpenak/eu_6092adjuntos/V.%2Inkesta.pdf)

3. *In the 2012/2013 academic year only three immigrant students completed all their education at Ramon Bajo out of the children of immigrants in the 6th year of Primary Education. The mobility of migrant students is a cause for concern with respect to the learning process.*

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*CMC: The Centre Maurits Coppieters (CMC) is a European Politic Foundation recognized by the European Parliament. CMC is linked to the European political family of the European Free Alliance (EFA). Its aims are: observing, analysing data and contributing to the debate on European public policy issues with special focus on the role of democratic-nationalist and regionalist movements and the process of European integration.*

*EHUgune: EHUgune is a meeting space between the University of the Basque Country and society, which has the aim of providing a convenient environment to reflect on social, cultural, economic and political issues that are considered strategic and / or priority.*

*Ezkerraberri Fundazioa: Ezkerraberri is a foundation linked to Aralar Basque polical party. Ezkerraberri aims to contribute to the socio-political debate in the Basque society from the standpoint of leftist democratic nationalism.*